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Constitutional Protection of Individual Rights in
Canada: The Impact of the New Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms
Robert A. Sed/er*
In the United States we have long relied on the federal Constitu-
tion as the primary source of legal protection against governmental
interference with individual rights.' In fact, the overriding principle
in the structure of constitutional governance is the principle of limi-
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B., 1956, J.D., 1959, University of
Pittsburgh.
This article is written from the perspective of an American commentator whose interest
in Canadian constitutionalism is of very recent vintage, sparked by the promulgation of the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Accordingly, there are inherent limitations in the type of
analysis that the author has attempted to undertake and his analysis should be received with
appropriate caution.
Many of the ideas set forth in this article were explored tentatively in an address, "The
Constitutional Protection of Individual Rights in Canada and the United States: Some Ob-
servations on Comparative Constitutional Development," delivered at the University of
Windsor Faculty of Law, on March 16, 1983. Each year Wayne State University Law School
and the University of Windsor Faculty of Law, which are across the river from each other,
sponsor Wayne-Windsor lectures on a topic of mutal interest. For 1983, the topic was the new
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
I want to express my special appreciation to Morris Manning, Q.C. of the Ontario Bar,
Professor Scott Fairley of the University of Windsor Faculty of Law, and Professor Jennifer
Bankier of the Dalhousie University Faculty of Law. Mr. Manning, a noted Canadian consti-
tutional practitioner and the author of Rights Freedoms and the Courts, has spent considerable
time with me, discussing his "activist" view of the Charter, and making specific comments
about the present article. Professor Fairley, who delivered the "Windsor Component" of the
Wayne-Windsor lectures in 1983, critiqued an earlier draft of the article. Professor Bankier, a
former colleaque of mine at Wayne State, has contributed a great deal to my general knowl-
edge of the Canadian legal system. The views expressed in the present article are, of course,
my own.
1 State constitutions have recently been "rediscovered" as a source of protection for indi-
vidual rights against governmental action. However, this rediscovery resulted primarily from
resorting to the state constitutions after the federal Constitution has proved unavailing. For
example, after the United States Supreme Court held in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), that inequalities in school financing between school districts
did not violate the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, challenges to inequalities
in school financing were mounted under the "education" clause and/or the equal protection
clauses of state constitutions. See, e.g., Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476,
585 P.2d 71 (1978); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 276 A.2d 359 (1977). Similarly, after
the United States Supreme Court held in Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 248 (1980) and Maher
v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), that state bans on Medicaid funding of abortions did not violate
the due process or equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, challenges to those
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tation on governmental power to protect individual rights. 2
In accordance with American constitutional tradition, provi-
sions designed to protect individual rights are generally broadly-
phrased and open-ended. 3 As a result, it has been the Supreme
Court's interpretation and application of these provisions to contem-
porary issues in American society that has shaped the development of
constitutional protection of individual rights in the United States.4
The Court has interpreted these provisions as imposing very signifi-
cant limitations on the federal and state governments' power to inter-
fere with individual rights.5
bans were asserted under "right to privacy" and equal protection clauses of state constitu-
tions. See, e.g., Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981).
On the other hand, state constitutional provisions dealing with the rights of criminal
defendants always will be invoked as a matter of course by defense counsel, contending that
they provide a greater degree of protection for the criminal accused than comparable provi-
sions of the federal Constitution. A number of state courts have agreed with this proposition
in regard to certain guarantees. Compare People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511
(1975), with United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (search and seizure), and People v.
Burden, 395 Mich. 462, 236 N.W.2d 505 (1975), with Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972)
(jury trial); see generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering The States' Bill of Rights, 9 U.
BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980); Kelman, Foreward." Rediscovering The State Constitutional Bill of R'ghts,
27 WAYNE L. REV. 413 (1981).
2 See Sedler, The Legitimay Debate in Constitutional Adjudication.: An Assessment anda Dij7erent
Perspective, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 93, 123-26 (1983).
The term "individual rights" may be broadly defined to refer to any individual interest
that is interfered with by governmental action. In this article, however, the term refers to
rights that are arguably within the scope of constitutional provisions that, by their terms, are
designed to protect individual interests against governmental action. Such constitutional pro-
visions will be referred to as the constitutional rights provisions of the constitution. The
Charter of Rights provisions are the constitutional rights provisions of the Canadian Consti-
tution. The constitutional rights provisions of the United States Constitution are the Bill of
Rights, the thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, nineteenth, twenty-fourth, and twenty-sixth
amendments, the provisions of art. I § 9, cls. 2 and 3, certain parts of art. I, § 10, cl. 1, certain
parts of art. III, § 2, cl. 3, and § 3, and art. IV, § 2, el. 1. The Bill of Rights and the four-
teenth amendment are the most important constitutional rights provisions of the United
States Constitution.
3 See Sedler, supra note 2, at 126-32.
4 See id. at 109-20.
5 While great debate exists over whether these provisions should have been interpreted in
this manner, that they have been so interpreted is universally agreed. The "activism" of the
Supreme Court-its disposition to invalidate federal and state laws or governmental action
interfering with individual rights-has varied only to some degree with the changing person-
nel of the Court. The "Burger Court," for example, has not been that much less "activist"
than the "Warren Court," and entirely new areas of substantive constitutional protection of
individual rights, such as gender-based equality, reproductive freedom, and commercial
speech, to take just a few examples, have been developed almost entirely by the "Burger
Court." Seegeneral
, 
THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (V.
Blasi ed. 1983).
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Canada, by contrast, historically followed the British tradition
of parliamentary supremacy. With the passage of the British North
America Act of 1867,6 Canada became a federal state, with powers
allocated between the federal government and the provinces. But
this constitutional structure did not contain limitations on the exer-
cise of power within each level of the government. In Canadian legal
theory, then, individual rights were not entrenched. The constitu-
tion provided the courts with no legal basis to override otherwise
valid governmental actions which interfered with individual rights.7
The Canada Act of 1982, enacted by the United Kingdom Par-
liament, significantly changed the structure of constitutional gover-
nance in Canada. First, the Act removed all of the United Kingdom
Parliament's authority over Canada and patriated the Canadian
Constitution.8 Second, it contained the Constitution Act, 1982,
6 This is now referred to as the Constitution Act, 1867. Together with its amendments,
it is referred to as the Constitution Acts, 1867 to 1975 (No. 2). There were two amendments
to the British North America Act in 1975, which explains the basis for this citation.
7 In 1960 Parliament enacted the Canadian Bill of Rights. CAN. REV. STAT. (App. III
1970). It was enacted as an ordinary statute and made applicable only to federal laws. See Pt.
II, §§ 2-3. It set forth a number of guarantees of individual rights, and provided generally
that federal laws should be "so contrued and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or infringe
• ..any of the rights or freedoms herein recognized and declared." Pt. I, § 2. Because the
Bill of Rights took the form of an ordinary statute rather than of an amendment to the
Constitution Act, 1867, the rights contained therein were not entrenched. The precise effect
of the new Bill of Rights on federal laws caused considerable debate among academics and in
the Supreme Court of Canada itself. The Supreme Court of Canada finally resolved the
controversy by holding that the Bill of Rights had the effect of overriding inconsistent federal
statutes by making them inoperative. SeeThe Queen v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282 (1969). In
this sense, the Bill of Rights was referred to as being a "quasi constitutional document repre-
senting a half-way house between a purely common law regime and a constitutional one."
Hogan v. The Queen, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 574, 597 (1975) (Laskin, J., dissenting). However, the
Supreme Court of Canada gave the Bill of Rights a very restrictive interpretation. Dybones
involved a provision of the federal Indian Act making it an offense for an Indian to be intoxi-
cated off a reservation, which the Court held was inconsistent with the "equality before the
law" clause of § 1 (b) of the Bill of Rights. This was the only case in which the Supreme
Court of Canada held a federal law to be inoperative under the Bill of Rights. In other cases
the provisions of the Bill of Rights influenced the Court's interpretation of federal legislation
or supported the imposition of fair procedures, but on the whole the Bill of Rights was inter-
preted very restrictively. See Hovius & Martin, The Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms in the
Supreme Court of Canada, 61 CAN. B. REV. 354, 355-63 (1983); See also P. HOGG, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW OF CANADA 431-43 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as P. HOGG, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAWv]; see generally W. TARNOPOLSKY, THE CANADIAN BILL OF RIGHTS (2d ed. 1975).
It has been contended that the Supreme Court of Canada relied on the fact that individual
rights were not entrenched to justify its restrictive-and in the view of the authors, unnecessa-
rily restrictive-interpretation of the Canadian Bill of Rights. See Hovius & Martin, supra, at
360-63; see also Jabour v. Law Soc'y of B.C., [1982] 1 S.C.R. 307, 362-65 (1982) (effect of lack
of entrenchment of freedom of speech).
8 Section 2 of the Canada Act 1982 provides: "No Act of the Parliament of the United
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which, together with the Constitution Act, 1867,9 now form the "fun-
damental law" of Canada.'0
For present purposes, the most significant feature of the Consti-
tution Act, 1982, is Part I: The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. The Charter, like the United States Constitution, pro-
vides textual protection for individual rights, and thus entrenches in-
dividual rights in the Canadian constitutional system.I l
Kingdom passed after the Constitution Act, 1982 comes into effect shall extend to Canada as
part of its law." Since the Constitution Act, 1867, lacked procedures for its amendment
within Canada, it could only be amended by the United Kingdom Parliament and was so
amended on a number of occasions upon "address" by the Canadian Parliament. With the
exception of amendments to the Constitution Act, 1867, however, laws enacted by the United
Kingdom Parliament were generally made inapplicable to Canada and the other Dominions
by the Statute of Westminster, 1931 (Imp.). CAN. REV. STAT. (App. 11 1970). Under that
statute, any law enacted by the United Kingdom Parliament could extend to a Dominion
only by an express declaration that the Dominion had requested and consented to such exten-
sion. Thus, the Constitution Act, 1867, could be and was in fact amended by the United
Kingdom Parliament following an "address" by the Parliament of Canada. See P. HOCG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 18-21.
Obtaining consent of all the provinces or a "substantial consensus" among them to a
proposed amendment to the Constitution Act, 1867, is a "convention" or "accepted practice"
in Canada, but it does not have the force of law. Thus, since the Canadian Parliament had
"addressed" the United Kingdom to amend the Constitution Act, 1867, by the promulgation
of the Canada Act 1982, under Canadian constitutional law, the United Kingdom Parlia-
ment would have the authority to enact the Canada Act 1982, for Canada, despite the fact
that most of the provinces did not support the proposal. See Reference re Resolution to
Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 (1981).
9 This legislation was formerly titled the British North America Act. With its amend-
ments, it is renamed the Constitution Acts 1867 to 1975 (No. 2). See note 6 supra and accom-
panying text.
10 Constitution Act, 1982, §§ 52, 60. The Canadian Constitution is cited as Constitution
Acts, 1867 to 1982. The Canadian Constitution emanates from the United Kingdom Parlia-
ment, unlike the United States Constitution, which, in theory, emanates from the "people."
Thus, as one Canadian commentator has observed, the Canadian Charter of Rights "is in its
origins, a governments' charter and not a peoples' charter." McWhinney, The Canadian Char-
ter of Rights and Freedoms: The Lessons of Comparative Jurisprudence, 61 CAN. B. REV. 55, 58-59
(1983). A committee of intermediate-level federal civil servants drafted the text of the Char-
ter. Id at 61. The federal Parliament's approval of the Charter served the same function in
Canadian constitutional history as did ratification of the Constitution by the states in Ameri-
can constitutional history.
11 For a discussion of the Charter as an instrument of national unity in Canada, see
generally Russell, The Political Purposes of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 61 CAN B.
REV. 30 (1983). The provisions of the Charter generally set forth rights in affirmative terms,
unlike the constitutional rights provisions of the United States Constitution which are ex-
pressed in terms of limitations on governmental action. For example, § 2(a) of the Charter
provides that everyone has the "freedom of conscience and religion," while the first amend-
ment to the United States Constitution provides that, "Congress shall make no law respecting
the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Nonetheless, it is likely
that most of the Charter's provisions will be interpreted as imposing limitations on govern-
mental action rather than as creating an affirmative entitlement to governmental assistance
in the exercise of those rights. See the discussion in Bender, The Canadian Charter of Rights and
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From the perspective of an American observer, this article will
examine the new Canadian Charter of Rights and discuss how our
neighbor to the North now constitutionally protects individual
rights. The article's major purpose, however, is to compare and ana-
lyze the protection of individual rights under the constitutional sys-
tems of our respective nations.
The comparison begins with a discussion of the Charter of
Rights' function in the Canadian constitutional system. Next, the
article demonstrates how individual rights, can be safeguarded
against governmental intrusion in Canada, apart from the Charter's
protections. A discussion of the Charter itself follows, which focuses
on the contemporary nature of the document, and shows that there is
a fundamental difference between the Charter's provisions and the
constitutional rights provisions of the United States Constitution.
The differences in the constitutional processes are then analyzed, and
the discussion turns to how these differences may affect the evolution
of constitutional protections in Canada. The article concludes with
observations on the comparative development of constitutional pro-
tection of individual rights in Canada and the United States.
I. The Function of The Charter of Rights in the Canadian
Constitutional System
A. Basic Outline of the Canadian Constitutional System
A brief outline of the Canadian constitutional system is neces-
sary to understand the function of the Charter of Rights. The follow-
ing discussion focuses on three fundamental distinctions between the
governmental structures which the Canadian and United States
Constitutions establish.
First of all, the Constitution Act, 1867, established a structure of
constitutional governance relating to the Canadian federal system
which is quite different from that of the American federal system.
First, the theory underlying the Canadian Constitution's allocation
of federal and provincial powers differs completely from the theory
underlying the United States Constitution's division of federal and
Freedoms and the United States Bill of Rights:. A Comparison, 28 McGILL L.J. 811, 822-24 (1983).
While the primary purpose of the Charter of Rights in Canada was to entrench individual
rights against governmental action, it has been contended that the Charter applies to the
resolution of private disputes as well. See, e.g., Doody, Freedom of the Press, The Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, and a New Categoq of Qualified Privilege, 61 CAN. B. REV. 124, 136-37
(1983); see also the discussion of the applicability of the Charter's provisions to actions of
private persons in Bender, supra, at 826-32.
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state powers. Second, in Canada there is essentially a unitary court
system, 12 as opposed to the dual system of federal and state courts in
the United States. Third, there are important differences between
the distribution of federal and provincial powers under the Canadian
Constitution, and federal and state powers under the United States
Constitution.
The Canadian Constitution allocates each power exclusively to
the federal or provincial level of government.13 Section 91 of the
Constitution Act, 1867, sets out the federal government's exclusive
powers,' 4 and section 92 sets out the exclusive powers of the prov-
inces. 15 In theory, these powers do not overlap. 16 Sometimes, how-
ever, one aspect of a particular activity may come within a head 7 of
federal power, while another aspect of the same activity comes within
a head of provincial power.' 8 In the case of direct conflict or pre-
emption, the exercise of federal power prevails, 19 but ordinarily
either the federal or provincial legislature has exclusive power over a
particular activity. Because of the exclusive allocation of power in
Canada, a law or governmental action is always open to constitu-
12 A separate Federal Court of Canada has jurisdiction over certain federal matters, such
as federal revenue, citizenship, and patents, and has jurisdiction to review the decisions of
federal agencies. See P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, supra note 7, at 124-25. Otherwise, the
Canadian court system is unitary.
13 See P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 95-96, 197-98.
14 Since Canada is a parliamentary system, the reference in § 91 of the Constitution Act,
1867, is simply to the powers of Parliament. This article uses the term "federal government"
to maintain comparability between Canada and the United States, where the "federal gov-
ernment" is divided into branches. Regarding the constitutional allocation of power between
the federal government and the states under the United States Constitution, however, if the
power belongs to any branch of the federal government, it is a "federal power" within the
meaning of the Constitution. See Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924) (admiralty
power).
15 The reference in § 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867, is simply to the powers of the
provincial legislatures.
16 "Overlap" is the Canadian term for "concurrent power."
17 "Head" is the Canadian term for the specific powers set forth in the Constitution Act,
1867.
18 This is referred to as "double aspect." See P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note
7, at 84-85. For example, provinces can create provincial highway offenses of driving without
due care and failing to remain at the scene of an accident under their power over "Property
and Civil Rights in the Province," Constitution Act, 1867, § 92(13), while the federal govern-
ment can create similar offenses under the general criminal law power, which is a federal
power in Canada Constitution Act, 1867, § 91(27). See P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
supra note 7, at 84.
19 This is referred to as "paramountcy." See P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, supra note
7, at 101-14.
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tional challenge on ultra vires grounds.20
In the United States, the essential feature of the Constitution's
allocation of federal and state power is concurrent power, what the
Canadians call overlap. The states possess the general sovereign
power, except when the federal Constitution prohibits or restricts a
particular exercise of it,21 and the federal government's enumerated
powers have been construed broadly.22 As a result both the states
20 The ultra vires question has been extensively litigated in Canada.
The Constitution Act, 1982, makes one change in the allocation of powers under the
Constitution Act, 1867. Section 50 amends the Constitution Act, 1867, by adding § 92A,
which expands provincial power over non-renewable natural resources. See P. HOCG, CA-
NADA AcT 1982 ANNOTATED 100-04 (1982) [hereafter referred to as P. HOGG, CANADA ACT].
However, this change was the only amendment in the 1982 Act which affected the allocation
of power.
21 In American constitutional theory the sovereignty formerly possessed by the British
Crown devolved upon the states at the time of Independence, so American states do not
depend on the federal Constitution as the source of their power. See United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). State sovereignty is affected by the federal Constitution
only in the sense that certain exercises of state sovereignty, such as the power to coin money or
the power to impose customs duties, are specifically denied to the states or can only be exer-
cised with Congressional approval, under art. I, § 10, or are implicitly denied because the
matter in issue is within the ambit of an exclusive federal power. Regarding the allocation of
federal and state power, the federal Constitution confers enumerated powers on the federal
government and provides under the supremacy clause that in case of a conflict between fed-
eral and state powers, the federal power prevails. The principle that the states possess the
general sovereign power except as prohibited or restricted by the federal Constitution is textu-
ally embodied in the tenth amendment.
22 The federal commerce power is the obvious example. It is difficult at the present time
to see any activity, no matter how "local," that is not at least arguably within the scope of the
federal commerce power. See, e.g., Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212 (1976) (purchase by
ex-convict from a local retailer of firearm shipped in interstate commerce).
In Canada, by contrast, the federal power to make laws in relation to "the regulation of
trade and commerce" under § 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867, has been narrowly con-
strued. On its face, this federal power conflicts with the provincial power over "Property and
Civil Rights in the Province" under § 92(13). Very early on, the Privy Council by interpreta-
tion added "inter-provincial" to "trade and commerce" under § 91(2). See Citizens' Ins. Co.
v. Parsons, [1881] 7 A.C. 96 (1881). "Inter-provincial Trade and Commerce" under the Ca-
nadian Constitution has been construed in nearly the same way as "interstate commerce"
under the United States Constitution was construed at the time of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). In Canada, for an activity to be within the reach of the federal power
over trade and commerce, it must be between provinces or nations, or must "affect the whole
dominion." See Caloil Inc. v. Attorney-General of Can., [1971] S.C.R. 543 (1970); see also P.
HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 267-75. No "affecting commerce" strand of
the federal trade and commerce power exists in Canadian law. Therefore, the federal govern-
ment in Canada not only cannot regulate the production of wheat for on the farm consump-
tion, as did the United States government in a plan approved by the United States Supreme
Court, in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), but also cannot regulate the quality of
products sold at retail, even if those products have been shipped in interprovincial commerce.
See Dominion Stores Ltd. v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 844 (1979); see also Fowler v. The
Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 213 (1980) (a federal law prohibiting the pollution of fishing waters
was ultra vires). The general regulation of labor relations in Canada is also a provincial mat-
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and the federal government have constitutional power to regulate
virtually any activity. Realistically then, American constitutional
law does not contain a true equivalent of the Canadian concept of
ultra vires.23
The exclusivity of Canada's allocation of governmental power,
and the concomitant receptiveness of the system to ultra vires chal-
lenges, necessarily meant that the courts would have to resolve con-
flicts between the two levels of government. Thus, the legitimacy of
judicial review was built into the Canadian constitutional system
from the very beginning. Canadian courts did not need a case analo-
gous to Marbuy v. Madison24 to establish their authority. Judicial re-
ter, as labor matters relate to "property and civil rights in the Province" under § 92(13). See,
e.g., Toronto Elec. Comm'rs v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396 (1925) C.P.R. v. Attorney-General of
B.C., [1950] A.C. 122 (1950). The federal government, however, can regulate labor relations
in industries that are subject to federal regulation under another head of federal power, such
as navigation and shipping, and communications. See Reference re Validity of Indus. Rela-
tions and Disputes Investigations Act (Stevedores Reference), [1955] S.C.R. 529 (1955); Com-
mission du Salaire Minimum v. Bell Tel. Co. of Can., [1966] S.C.R. 767 (1966); see also P.
HOGc, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 304-08.
Under § 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the federal government also has the residuary
power to make laws for the "Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada." This power
has been narrowly construed to be limited to "emergency" situations and to matters that "by
their inherent nature affect the Dominion as a whole." See Attorney-General of Ont. v. Ca-
nada Temperance Fed'n, [1946] A.C. 193 (1946). Thus, the power of the federal government
to enact temporary wage and price controls during a period of high inflation, which in the
United States would be unquestionably within the federal commerce power, see Fry v. United
States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), was sustained in Canada as a response to an "emergency" and so
within the "Peace, Order, and good Government Power." See The Anti-Inflation Act Refer-
ence, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373 (1976); see also P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at
241-65.
23 Ultra vires in Canadian constitutional law must be distinguished from paramountcy,
which is the Canadian equivalent of federal supremacy. Ultra vires challenges to provincial
laws arise when no conflicting federal legislation exists. The question in such a case is
whether the matter in issue is within the regulatory authority of the province. See, e.g., Com-
mission du Salaire Minimum v. Bell. Tel. Co. of Can., [1966] S.C.R. 767 (1966). A para-
mountcy challenge can arise only when (1) both a federal law and a provincial law validly
apply to the same set of facts under the double aspect principle, see note 20 supra, and (2) the
laws are inconsistent either because they expressly conflict, or because of negative implication
(federal preemption). In the case of inconsistency, federal law controls, and thus is said to be
"paramount." See P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 101-14. In practice, the
Canadian courts are not likely to find inconsistency by negative implication; therefore, para-
mountcy applies practically only in the case of express conflict. Id at 106-10; see aso Con-
struction Montcalm, Inc. v. Minimum Wage Comm'n, [1979] 1 S.C.R (1978) (Quebec
minimum wage act did not conflict with federal law, and so could be applied to a contractor
working on a federal project in Quebec).
24 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). The power of judicial review then was assumed in Ca-
nada. However, the "repugnancy" rationale of Marbu9 , v. Madison (since the Constitution is
superior to ordinary law, a law in violation of the Constitution could not be recognized by the
courts) was the same rationale under which the Canadian courts assumed the right to review
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view was considered to be supportive of, rather than inconsistent
with, parliamentary democracy.2 5 When the Charter of Rights was
promulgated in 1982, it expressly provided that the judiciary would
have the responsibility to define its provisions and to decide whether
a law or governmental action was consistent with the Charter.2 6
the validity of laws enacted by Parliament and the provincial legislatures. As Professor Hogg
has observed:
The Privy Council (as the ultimate court of appeal for Canada) and the provin-
cial courts in the years immediately after 1867, assumed the right to review the
validity of legislation enacted by the Canadian legislative bodies. They used an
argument similar to the one which had been accepted in Marbuiy v. Madison. If a
statute was inconsistent with the B.N.A. Act, then the B.N.A. Act had to prevail,
because it was an imperial statute. Imperial statutes extending to Canada had over-
riding force because the Colonial Laws Validity Act provided that colonial legisla-
tion repugnant to an imperial statute extending to the colony was invalid. After the
Supreme Court of Canada was established in 1875 it naturally assumed the same
power.
P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 43. See also Law Society of Upper Canada
v. Skapinker, slip op. at 9-11 (May 3, 1984).
25 The American term is "electorally accountable policymaking." See M. PERRY, THE
CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 9-20 (1982). In Canada, however, the
role of the judiciary in defining the meaning of the constitution originally developed in the
context of the judiciary's being the "umpire in a federal system," that is, in defining the
respective limits of federal and provincial power. It is an oft-repeated statement in Canada
that the courts do not have any concern with "the wisdom or expediency or policy" of a
statute. See Attorney-General of Ont. v. Attorney General of Can., [1912] A.C. 571, 582
(1912); The Anti-Inflation Reference [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, 424-25 (1976) (opinion of Laskin,
CJ.). The United States Supreme Court frequently makes the same statement when it rejects
a due process or equal protection challenge to economic regulation. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) ("With the wisdom of the policy adopted, with the adequacy
or practicability of the law enacted to forward it, the courts are both incompetent and unau-
thorized to deal."). The difference between the situation in the United States and the situa-
tion in Canada prior to the promulgation of the Charter was that in Canada the courts lacked
the authoriy to invalidate legislation within the power of enacting level of government, while
in the United States the courts could invalidate "unwise" legislation on constitutional rights
grounds. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527-31 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Nevertheless, precisely because judicial review in Canada originally developed in the
context of the courts' defining the respective limits of federal and provincial power, the exer-
cise of judicial review appears to have been relatively non-controversial, and certainly not
considered to be inconsistent with parliamentary democracy. The "momentum" acquired
during the pre-Charter period apparently carried over, and the judiciary's authority to de-
clare federal and provincial laws in violation of the Charter has not been seriously questioned.
Because of the override provisions, however, Parliament and the provincial legislatures will
have the final say over the circumstances in which most of the Charter's provisions will
operate.
26 Section 52, the supremacy clause of the Constitution Act, 1982, provides that "[t]he
Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with
the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect."
According to Professor Hogg, § 52 provides the basis for judicial review of all legislation in
Canada. All remedies for protection against unconstitutional legislation that were previously
available continue to be available by virtue of§ 52. Section 24(1) specifically authorizes the
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Therefore, the controversy over the propriety of judicial review,
which has long been a feature of the American constitutional scene,
should not be expected to arise in Canada.27
A second difference in the two constitutional structures is that
Canada basically has a unitary court system, in contrast to the
United States' dual system of federal and state courts. 28 The
Supreme Court of Canada is the highest court of appeal for all of
Canada and has the authority to decide all questions of provincial
law, just as an American state court decides all questions of state
law. 29 Thus, the dichotomy between questions of federal and state
courts to provide remedies for violations of rights guaranteed by the Charter. See P. HOGG,
CANADA AcT, supra note 20, at 64-66, 104-05.
While Parliament and the provincial legislatures have the power under the override pro-
visions to make laws operative notwithstanding a number of the Charter's provisions, this
power does not affect the judiciary's role in defining the meaning of the Charter. It merely
means that Parliament and the provincial legislatures can make laws operative even if the
judiciary were to find that those laws violate the Charter.
27 However, Canadian colleagues tell me that there is likely to be considerable debate in
Canada over how expansive an interpretation the Supreme Court of Canada should give to
the Charter's provisions. This debate will be similar to the debate over standards of review,
,or what has been called the "legitimacy debate," in the United States. For a summary of the
"legitimacy debate" in the United States, see Sedler, supra note 2, at 95-108. For a provoca-
tive discussion of standards of review under the Charter, see Fairley, Enforcing the Charter: Some
Thoughts on an Appropriate andJust StandardforJudicial Review, 4 Sup. CT. L. REv. 217 (1982).
28 As to the function of the Federal Court of Canada, see note 12 supra.
29 Unlike U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, the Constitution Act, 1867, did not give independent
constitutional status to a supreme court in Canada. Section 101 of the Constitution Act,
1867, authorized Parliament to provide for a "General Court of Appeal for Canada." In
1875, Parliament established the Supreme Court of Canada, with civil and criminal appellate
jurisdiction throughout Canada. Under the Constitution Act, 1867, then, the Supreme
Court's composition and jurisdiction depend entirely on federal statute. However, the status
of the Supreme Court of Canada may have been constitutionalized to some extent by § 41 of
the Constitution Act, 1982, which refers to an "amendment to the Constitution of Canada in
relation to the composition of the Supreme Court of Canada." Such an amendment may be
made only where authorized by both Houses of Parliament and the legislatures of all the
provinces, and it is arguable that this constitutional reference to the Supreme Court of Ca-
nada would preclude Parliament from abolishing the Court by means of ordinary legislation.
Section 92(14) of the Constitution Act, 1867, allocates to the provinces the power to
establish courts within each province. The provincial courts can exercise the full range of
jurisdiction, including questions arising under federal as well as provincial law. Each prov-
ince has a court of appeals which, for purposes of comparison to the court system in the
United States, is a combined state supreme court and a federal court of appeals (except for
matters within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Canada). The system of lower courts
varies somewhat among the provinces, but in general consists of a trial court of general juris-
diction, variously referred to as Queen's Bench, the High Court, or the Supreme Court, and
lower provincial courts. See P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, supra note 7, at 115-26.
Prior to 1949, appeals could be taken from the Supreme Court of Canada to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council. Although such appeals were abolished in 1949, Can. Stat.
ch. 37, § 3 (1949), prior Privy Council decisions are considered to have the same precedential
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law that has assumed such importance in the United States is com-
pletely absent in Canada. When a case comes before the Supreme
Court of Canada, it can decide any question properly raised in that
case, whether it involves the meaning of the Constitution or the scope
of a municipal law.30
Finally, the distribution of federal and provincial powers under
the Canadian Constitution differs from the allocation of federal and
state powers under the United States Constitution. On the whole,
the scope of power which section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867,
grants the federal government has been construed more narrowly
than the scope of federal power in the United States. In Canada, any
activity within the ambit of federal power inherently exceeds the
purview of provincial power, even absent preemptive federal legisla-
tion.3' However, in Canada, unlike the United States, the general
criminal law power is a federal one.3 2 Thus, Canada has a uniform
system of general criminal law, and provincial laws are subject to
invalidation on ultra vires grounds, as "being in relation to the crimi-
nal law."'33
effect as decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. See Francis v. The Queen, [1956] S.C.R.
618, 621 (1956).
30 Because the Supreme Court of Canada is the final authority on the interpretation of
the entire body of Canadian law, the common law does not differ from province to province
in Canada, as it does in American states. So except for the civil law of Quebec, and the
distinctive statutes of each province, the law of Canada is generally uniform throughout the
country. P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 123.
However, in 1975, appeals as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada from the provin-
cial courts of appeal were generally abolished in both civil and criminal cases, and the
Supreme Court of Canada now controls its own docket, much like the United States Supreme
Court. Applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada are decided by
benches of three judges. P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 122 n.30. As I
understand it, leave is rarely granted in cases involving only questions of provincial law, so
that in practice the provincial courts of appeal are the final interpreters of most questions of
provincial law.
31 See note 20 supra.
32 Constitution Act, 1867, § 91(27).
33 See note 151 injfa and accompanying text.
However, under Constitution Act, 1867, § 92(15), the provinces are authorized to impose
penal sanctions for the enforcement of provincial laws, which means that they can enact
penal laws which are often indistinguishable from federal criminal laws. In this sense there is
a reversal of the situation in the United States, where the states have the general criminal law
power and federal enactments must be brought within an enumerated grant of federal power,
so that in Canada, provincial penal law is "specialized," while in the United States, it is the
federal criminal law that is "specialized."
Because the provinces are granted broad powers under § 92, most provincial enactments
can arguably be brought within an independent head of provincial power, with the result
that the provincial penal law power in Canada, like the federal criminal law power in the
United States, is in fact substantial. According to Professor Hogg, the dominant tendency has
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B. Function of the Charter of Rights
The Charter of Rights entrenches individual rights in the Cana-
dian constitutional system. The concept of entrenchment is very im-
portant in Canadian legal theory, for it alters the principle of
parliamentary supremacy 34 and allows the judiciary to protect indi-
vidual rights from governmental interference. In Canada, as in the
United States, the exercise of governmental power interfering with
individual rights is now constitutionally limited. Under both sys-
tems, the courts can provide relief against governmental action that
violates those constitutional limitations. However, as pointed out
above, there are still significant differences in the structures of consti-
tutional governance established by the United States and Canadian
Constitutions. We will now consider how those differences can lead
been for the Supreme Court of Canada to uphold provincial penal legislation against ultra
vires challenges. See P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 291-93. Similarly, as
another commentator has observed:
At the present time most federal laws are upheld, as are most provincial laws. This
does not mean that there is a totally concurrent criminal law power. Nor does it
have to mean that the definition of criminal law is different depending on whether a
federal or provincial law is challenged. . . . Most federal laws are valid because
Parliament rarely imposed prohibitions and penalties unless there exists some public
wrong. Similarly, most provincial prohibitory laws are valid because the provincial
legislature ordinarily acts with the bonafide intention of legislating within its sphere
of authority. Except for the inner core of the criminal domain, there are many
public wrongs which can be prohibited to achieve a valid provincial purpose and
thus offset any criminal aspect. Hence the asymmetry in the Constitution is more
illusory than real.
Arvay, The Criminal Law Power in the Constitution: and then Came McNeil and Dupond, 11 OT-
TAWA L. REv. 1, 25 (1979). Nonetheless, despite the substantiality of the provincial penal law
power, it must be emphasized that the general criminal law power in Canada is a federal
rather than a provincial function. The general criminal law power includes what is referred
to above as the "inner core of the criminal domain," that is, "acts or omissions which are
inherently criminal because they are contrary to society's fundamental norms," or "conduct
contrary to public morality and public order, or which is harmful to one's person or destruc-
tive of one's property." Id at 24.
34 The principle of parliamentary supremacy was necessarily incorporated into the Con-
stitution Act, 1867, which established parliamentary institutions along the model of the
United Kingdom. The Preamble refers to a "Constitution similar in Principle to that of the
United Kingdom." The range of legislative power exercised by the United Kingdom Parlia-
ment was distributed in Canada between the federal government and the provinces, and no
limitations on the exercise of either federal or provincial power were contained in the Act.
Since § 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, provides that a law inconsistent with the provisions
of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect, parliamentary
supremacy is thereby altered. The "highest law" in the hierarchy of laws in Canada is the
Constitution, which includes the Charter of Rights; therefore, the individual rights guaran-
teed in the Charter are now entrenched against governmental action. Note again, however,
that most of the Charter's provisions are subject to override under § 33. To this extent, par-
liamentary supremacy remains incorporated into the Canadian constitutional structure.
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to judicial protection of individual rights in Canada, totally apart
from the Charter, in circumstances where in the United States, such
protection could be afforded only by invocation of the constitutional
rights provisions of the Constitution.
II. Canadian Protection of Individual Rights In Addition to the
Charter's Provisions
In Canada, apart from the Charter's provisions, individual
rights can be legally protected against governmental action on both
non-constitutional and ultra vires grounds. These forms of protec-
tion existed prior to the promulgation of the Charter, and they re-
main viable. Affording protection on these bases may reduce the
instances in which the Canadian courts will have to resolve chal-
lenges under the Charter.
A. Non-Constitutional Grounds of Protection
In Canada, protection of individual rights on non-constitutional
grounds is structurally available in all cases because of the unitary
court system. Just as federal courts in the United States can interpret
a federal law to avoid a constitutional question,3 5 the Canadian
courts can interpret all laws-federal, provincial, and municipal-in
this manner. It is a principle of federal statutory interpretation in
the United States that statutes should be construed, where possible,
to avoid constitutional issues.36 Similarly, in the case of ultra vires
challenges the Supreme Court of Canada has stated, "If words in a
35 For example, the court could hold that the arguably protected activity is not within
the scope of the law. Thus, in Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), the Supreme
Court held that the Smith Act reached only the advocacy of forcible overthrow of the govern-
ment, thereby avoiding resolution of the issue "in terms of constitutional compulsion." Id at
319. Similarly, in Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), and Noto v. United States,
367 U.S. 290 (1961), the Court interpreted the Smith Act's "membership clause" as reaching
only active membership in illegal organization with specific intent to further the organiza-
tion's illegal purpose. It is not always possible, however, in light of the language and legisla-
tive history, to give a law such a narrow interpretation. Therefore, in United States v. Robel,
389 U.S. 258 (1967), the Supreme Court held that it could not read the requirement of active
membership with specific intent into a federal law prohibiting members of "Communist-act
organizations" from working in a defense facility, and thus was forced to confront the consti-
tutional question, invalidating the law on first amendment grounds. Id. at 262.
36 The classic exposition of this principle was made by Justice Brandeis in his concurring
opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936):
When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a
serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court
will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which
the question may be avoided.
297 U.S. at 348 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1933)).
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statute are fairly susceptible of two constructions, of which one will
result in the statute being intra vires, and the other will have the con-
trary result, the former is to be preferred. ' 37 In this circumstance,
the Canadian court "reads down" the statute to bring it within the
power of the enacting level of government. 38 The same rationale
would justify adoption in Canada of the "avoiding a question as to
its consitutionality" rule of federal statutory interpretation in the
United States: where reasonably possible, a law implicating individ-
ual rights arguably within the protection of the Charter should be
"read down" so as to avoid a question as to its constitutionality
under the Charter.
What this means then is that the Canadian courts potentially
may protect individual rights in any case by holding that the alleg-
edly protected activity does not fall within the scope of the law that
has been invoked against it.a3 For example, in Samur v. City of Que-
bec,40 the Supreme Court of Canada held that a municipal law
prohibiting the distribution of literature without the police chief's
permission could not be invoked against Jehovah's Witnesses who
sought to distribute religious literature. One of the grounds for the
decision was that the distribution of religious literature did not fall
within the law's prohibition. 41 In contrast, the first amendment pro-
vides the only structural basis on which the United States Supreme
Court can invalidate similar state or local government measures. 42
37 McKay v. The Queen, [1965] S.C.R. 798, 804 (1965).
38 See the discussion of "reading down" in P. HocG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note
7, at 90-92.
39 This assumes of course, that the challenged law is reasonably susceptible of such an
interpretation. In The Queen v. Oakes, 40 O.R.2d 660 (Ont. Ct. App. 1983), the Ontario
Court of Appeals held that the "reverse onus" provision of § 8 of the Narcotics Act that
requires the accused to disprove intention to sell after the prosecution has proved mere posses-
sion, violated the presumption of innocence provision of § 11 (d). The court rejected the argu-
ment that the law should be construed as being "inoperative" in those cases where the
accused possessed only a small quantity of a narcotic drug, which did not indicate that the
drug was possessed for the purpose of sale. The court took the position that such an interpre-
tation was improper because it would require the court to "rewrite the statute on a case by
case basis," and that in the statute Parliament could have, but did not, draw a distinction
based upon the quantity of the drug possessed.
40 [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 (1953).
41 This was the ground of decision in the opinion of Justice Kerwin. At that time the
Supreme Court of Canada appeared to follow the English practice by which the individual
Justices deliver separate opinions rather than there being an opinion for the Court. At the
present time, the opinions of the Supreme Court of Canada are substantially the same as the
majority (or plurality), concurring, and dissenting opinions in the United States Supreme
Court.
42 See, e.g., Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303
U.S. 444 (1938).
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Another non-constitutional theory which Canadian courts can
employ to protect individual rights rests on the protections available
at common law. This avenue remains available so long as a statute
does not prescribe a contrary result. For example, the Canadian
Constitution does not require the government to compensate for the
taking of private property.43 But the Supreme Court of Canada has
upheld the common law right to compensation where private prop-
erty is taken for public use.44 The Supreme Court of Canada likewise
invoked the common law to protect Jehovah's Witnesses from exten-
sive harassment by Quebec provincial officials in the 1950's. 45
Governmental action interfering with individual rights may also
be invalidated if the officer or governmental body lacked statutory
authority to take the challenged action.46 Thus, in Canadian Broad-
casting Corporation v. Quebec Police Commission,47 the Supreme Court of
Canada held that the Quebec Police Commission lacked the power
to punish an alleged contempt which occurred in its proceedings.
Finally, the Supreme Court of Canada exercises supervisory con-
trol over the lower courts and can ultimately decide all matters of
substantive law and procedure. For example, criminal trials in Ca-
nada are conducted according to uniform procedures. 48 Therefore,
the Supreme Court of Canada can protect criminal defendants on
non-constitutional grounds, just as the United States Supreme Court
can extend non-constitutional protections to federal criminal
43 Property rights are not protected under the Charter. See notes 100-02 ifra and accom-
panying text.
44 Unless a statute specifically gives the government the right to expropriate the particu-
lar kind of property without compensating the owner, the courts will enforce the common law
right. See Manitoba Fisheries, Ltd. v. The Queen, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 101 (1978).
45 See Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121 (1959); Lamb v. Benoit, [1959] S.C.R.
321 (1959); Chaput v. Romain, [1955] S.C.R. 834 (1955). In these cases, Quebec officials
broke up meetings of Jehovah's Witnesses, arrested them for distributing pamphlets, and en-
gaged in retaliatory cancellation of licences. The victims sought and recovered damages, but
possibly could have obtained injunctive relief as well.
46 The same kind of question arises in the United States Supreme Court and the federal
courts with respect to the statutory authority of federal officers. In Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116 (1958), the Supreme Court held that the Secretary of State lacked the statutory authority
to refuse to issue passports to members of the Communist Party. The Secretary's authority of
refusal interfered with the exercise of the constitutional right of travel. Id. at 125-29. See also
Exparle Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944), in which the Supreme Court held that the military au-
thorities were not authorized to detain concededly loyal persons of Japanese ancestry.
47 [1979] 2 S.C.R. 618 (1979).
48 Section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867, gives the federal government the exclu-
sive power over "the Procedure in Criminal Matters." The provinces have the power over
civil procedure under § 92(14).
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defendants. 49
Because of the unitary court system in Canada, then, the courts
can potentially protect individual rights in all cases on non-constitu-
tional grounds. United States federal courts can do so only when a
federal law or governmental action is challeged. Since the over-
whelming number of cases in the federal courts challenge state laws
or governmental action, these courts have fewer opportunities to pro-
tect individual rights on non-constitutional grounds than have the
Canadian courts.
B. Ultra Vires Grounds of Protection
The second way the Canadian judiciary can protect individual
rights is to deem the challenged law or governmental action ultra
vires the enacting level of government. This ground of invalidation
was sometimes invoked in the pre-Charter era and remains following
the promulgation of the Charter. In some pre-Charter cases, the Ca-
nadian courts invalidated laws or governmental action interfering
with individual rights on ultra vires grounds, thereby effectively
achieving the same result that was or would have been achieved in
the United States by the invocation of constitutional limitations. For
the most part, the Canadian ultra vires cases involved challenges to
provincial laws or governmental action.50 And in at least some of
them, the fact that the challenged provincial law or governmental
action implicated important individual rights, such as freedom of ex-
pression, was a factor in the court's resolution of the ultra vires issue.
In the pre-Charter era, the Canadian courts were not necessarily try-
ing, by an expansive use of ultra vires, to mitigate the absence of
entrenchment of individual rights. There are numerous cases where
the Canadian courts sustained against ultra vires challenges, laws, or
governmental action that now clearly violate the Charter,5' and that
49 Again, the position of the Supreme Court of Canada in all criminal cases is parallel to
that of the United States Supreme Court in federal cases.
50 Similarly, in the United States the overwhelming number of constitutional cases
presenting claims of individual rights involve challenges to state or local laws or government
action.
51 See Brooks-Bidlake v. Attorney-General of B.C., [1923] A.C. 450 (1923) (prohibition of
employment of Japanese and Chinese in connection with timber license on provincial prop-
erty); Quong-Wing v. The King, 49 S.C.R. 440 (1914) (prohibition of employment of white
females in places of business kept or managed by Chinese); Cunningham & Attorney-General
of B.C. v. Homa, [1903] A.C. 151 (1903) (provincial election law prohibiting Japanese from
voting).
Other cases upheld governmental actions which at least arguably violate the Charter.
See Walter v. Attorney-General of Alta., [1969] S.C.R. 383 (1969) (provincial law prohibiting
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would have been invalidated by the United States Supreme Court.
This means of protecting individual rights has always been structur-
ally available under the Canadian Constitution and was at least
sometimes invoked effectively in the pre-Charter era.
In the Alberta Press Case,52 which the Supreme Court of Canada
decided in 1938, a provincial law enacting a "social credit" program
included provisions requiring newspapers to publish the govern-
ment's reply to printed criticism of the program. The Court held
these provisions to be ultra vires the province. Five of the six Justices
based their decision on the ground that the provisions were part of
the underlying "social credit" program which itself was ultra vires
the province. Three of the Justices, however, also posited that the
provisions were ultra vires the province, because only Parliament had
power to regulate the press. These opinions emphasized the impor-
tance of a free press in a democratic society.53 In the United States,
of course, these provisions would have violated the first amend-
ment.54 In the absence of a comparable specific constitutional limita-
tion on government power, the Supreme Court of Canada used the
ultra vires concept to protect freedom of the press in this case.
Similarly, in Samur v. Quebec,55 ultra vires appeared to be the pri-
mary basis on which the Court invalidated a municipal law requir-
ing police permission for the distribution of literature. The "pith and
substance" 56 of the law was not the regulation of the streets, which is
within provincial power, but rather the censoring and control of the
distribution of written publications, which is not. In addition, the
Court held that provincial power to regulate "civil rights within the
province" 57 and "matters of a local or private nature within the prov-
ince" did not extend to the regulation of freedom of expression.
religious colonies from acquiring additional landholdings); Nova Scotia Bd. of Censors v.
McNeil, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 662 (1978) (provincial censorship of movies that "offended accepta-
ble standards of morality"); DuPond v. City of Montreal, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 770 (1978) (munici-
pal law granting officials the authority to prohibit the holding of assemblies if they had reason
to believe that the public peace or safety was endangered).
52 Reference re Alta. Legislation [1938] S.C.R. 100 (1938). An appeal to the Privy Coun-
cil on the validity of the press bill was dismissed on grounds ofmootness. Attorney-General of
Alta. v. Attorney-General of Can., [1939] A.C. 117 (1938).
53 See the opinion of Duff, Cj., at 132-35, and Cannon, J., at 145-46.
54 See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
55 [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 (1953).
56 The term "pith and substance" refers to the "dominant or most important characteris-
tic of the challenged law." P. HOOG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 80.
57 The term "Civil Rights," as used in § 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867, refers to
private rights between individuals, such as tort and contract rights, The term "human
rights" is used in Canada to refer to freedom from discrimination and the like.
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Statutory interference with the freedom of expression was also
an important consideration in Switzman v. Ebling,58 which the
Supreme Court of Canada decided in 1959. The Court had previ-
ously held that the provinces had the authority to enact a padlock
law that applied to houses of prostitution;59 but in Switzman the
Court decided that such a law was ultra vires the provinces when
applied to a house used for "communist propaganda. ' 60 Regarding
religious expression, the 1955 decision of Birks & Son v. City of Mon-
treal6t held that a provincial law authorizing municipal councils to
require the closing of stores on religious holidays related to the crimi-
nal law and thus was ultra vires.62
Protection of individual rights on ultra vires grounds also ap-
pears in several cases involving aliens and Indians. In Union Colliery of
British Columbia v. Bgden,63 decided in 1899, the Privy Council held
that a British Columbia law prohibiting Chinese from working in
underground mines was ultra vires. The "pith and substance" of the
law related to aliens,64 an area within the federal government's exclu-
sive power, rather than to "property and civil rights in the province"
or "local works and undertakings. '65 In the more recent case of The
58 [1957] S.C.R. (1956).
59 Bedard v. Dawson, [1923] S.C.R. 681 (1923).
60 Cf Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980), (invalidating on first
amendment grounds a state law authorizing the issuance of injunctions against the habitual
use of premises for the commercial showing of obscene films).
61 [1955] S.C.R. 799 (1955).
62 The regulation of moral and religious matters, such as whether stores should be closed
on Sunday, comes within the proper exercise of the criminal law power, and so is ultra vires.
See Attorney-General of Ont. v. Hamilton St. Ry. [1903] A.C. 524 (1903). The federal Lord's
Day Act, however, allows provinces to opt-out and to permit activities on Sunday that are
proscribed by the federal Act. The opting-out provision has been upheld as being within
Parliamentary authority. See Lord's Day Alliance of Can. v. Attorney-General of B.C., [1959]
S.C.R. 497 (1959); see also Lieberman v. The Queen, [1963] S.C.R. 643 (1963), in which a
provincial law requiring the closure of pool rooms and bowling alleys after midnight on week-
days and all day Sunday was characterized as a law concerned with secular rather than reli-
gious matters, and so was intra vires.
In the United States, a religious holiday closure law, unlike a Sunday closing law, could
not be deemed to advance a secular purpose, and so would violate the first amendment's
establishment clause. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); cf. Larkin v. Grendel's
Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (invalidating state law giving churches the effective power to
veto applications for liquor licenses in proximity to a church).
63 [1899] A.C. 580 (1899).
64 The purpose of the law was to discriminate against aliens and Canadian subjects of
Chinese origin. Apparently, most of the Chinese in British Columbia at that time were aliens.
65 The United States Supreme Court reached a similar result in Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33 (1915), under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. In Traux, the Court
invalidated an Arizona law restricting the employment of aliens by private employers.
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Queen v. Sutherland, Wilson, & Attorney-General of Canada,66 the Supreme
Court of Canada held that a provincial law applicable only to Indi-
ans exceeded the province's authority.67
Finally, provincial laws discriminating against extra-provincial
trade in favor of intra-provincial trade have been held to be ultra
vires in several cases.68 These decisions achieved the same result in
Canada as has the United States Supreme Court's negative com-
merce clause doctrine69.
As stated previously, the suggestion is not being made that in
the pre-Charter era the Canadian courts necessarily were trying to
use ultra vires to protect individual rights. Although the fact that the
challenged provincial law implicated important individual rights
was a relevant consideration in some of the cases, a number of laws
seriously interfering with individual rights were sustained against ul-
tra vires challenges. The above discussion instead is designed to
demonstrate how the structure of the Canadian Constitution allows
ultra vires challenges, as well as Charter challenges, to laws interfer-
ing with individual rights. As a practical matter, this type of protec-
tion of individual rights is not structurally available under the
United States Constitution.
In Canada, any law or governmental action interfering with in-
dividual rights is potentially subject to challenge on both ultra vires
and Charter grounds. Where both kinds of challenges are joined in
the same case, Canadian courts should arguably consider the ultra
vires challenge before considering the Charter claim. If the particu-
lar level of government lacked the constitutional power to enact the
law in question, then that exercise of power was analytically void and
there is no need for the court to speculate on whether the Charter
66 [1980] 2 S.C.R. 451 (1980).
67 The fact that the law applied only to Indians meant that it would derogate from the
federal power to legislate in respect to Indians under § 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.
Since this express racial classification could not survive any degree of scrutiny, in the United
States it would violate the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. "[I]t is simply
not possible for a state law to be valid under our Constitution which makes the criminality of
an act depend on the race of the actor." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (Stewart,
J., concurring) (quoting his concurring opinion in McLaughlin v. Flordia, 379 U.S. 184, 198
(1964)).
68 See Burns Foods, Ltd. v. Attorney-General of Man., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 494 (1973); Attor-
ney-General of Man. v. Manitoba Egg & Poultry Ass'n, [1971] S.C.R. 689 (1971).
69 The United States Supreme Court has consistently invalidated state laws that have the
effect of discriminating against interstate commerce or out-of-state interests because o 'the in-
terstate nature of that commerce or the out-of-state nature of those interests. See, e.g., Lewis v.
BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
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would have been violated if such power existed. Moreover, principles
of constitutional adjudication in Canada, as in the United States, 70
instruct the courts to avoid unnecessary constitutional pronounce-
ments and to decide constitutional questions on the narrowest possi-
ble grounds.7 1 Whether the Supreme Court of Canada will in fact
consider the ultra vires challenge before considering the constitu-
tional claim is a matter of surmise. Nonetheless, on the assumption
that the ultra vires ground generally would be considered a narrower
ground of decision than the Charter ground, the surmise is a reason-
able one.7 2
This section has demonstrated how individual rights can be ju-
dicially protected in Canada, totally apart from the Charter's provi-
sions. Whenever a challenge is made to a law or governmental
action implicating individual rights, there are three potential ways
by which the right can be judicially protected: (1) non-constitutional
protection; (2) ultra vires; (3) Charter of Rights. In the United
States, by contrast, the federal courts cannot provide non-constitu-
tional protection where state laws or governmental action implicate
individual rights, and apart from federal preemption, 73 there is rarely
an issue under the United States Constitution concerning the compe-
tency of the federal or state governments to enact particular laws or
otherwise act.
70 "The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it,' [and] will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is applied.' " Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth.,
297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. and P.S.S. v.
Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)).
71 See the discussion of avoiding unnecessary constitutional pronouncements in Cana-
dian Nat'l Transp., Ltd. & Canadian Nat'l Ry. v. Attorney-General Can., 49 N.R. 241, 270
(Supreme Ct. 1983) (Dickson, J.), and the discussion of deciding constitutional questions on
the narrowest possible constitutional ground in The Queen v. Hauser, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 984,
992 (1979) (Pigeon, J.).
72 In the recent case of The Queen v. Westendorp, 46 N.R. 30 (Can. Sup. Ct. 1983), the
Supreme Court of Canada held that a municipal law prohibiting a person from being on the
streets for purposes of prostitution was ultra vires as being in relation to the criminal law.
The assailant had challenged the law as violating § 7 of the Charter, but later abandoned this
ground of challenge. Other recent cases coming from the lower courts have invalidated pro-
vincial and municipal "indecent entertainment" type laws on ultra vires grounds, as being in
relation to the criminal law. See Prestige Video Productions Victoria and Attorney-General
of British Columbia, [1983] 6 W.W.R. (B.C.S.C. 1982); Re Attorney-General of New Bruns-
wick and Rio Hotel, Ltd., 1 D.L.R.4th 418 (N.B. Ct. App. 1983). Whenever provincial efforts
to interfere with freedom of expression are invalidated on ultra vires grounds, a potential
question under § 2(b) of the Charter is thereby avoided.
73 In the United States, state laws interfering with individual rights occasionally have
been invalidated on federal pre-emption grounds. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497
(1956) (sedition); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 42 (1941) (alien registration).
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The fact that individual rights structurally can be protected
against governmental action in Canada on non-Charter grounds as
well as on Charter grounds could affect the development of constitu-
tional protection of individual rights in Canada compared to such
development in the United States. There will be comparatively
fewer cases in Canada than in the United States, at least over a com-
parable period of time, in which the Supreme Court of Canada will
be required to resolve the case on Charter grounds and thus would
have the occasion to define the meaning of the Charter's provisions.
To this degree, Charter law in Canada could develop somewhat
more slowly than constitutional rights law has developed in the
United States.
III. The Charter of Rights
As previously stated, the Charter of Rights entrenches individ-
ual rights in the Canadian constitutional system so that these rights
may receive judicial protection against governmental intrusion.
These rights are set forth in sections 2 through 23.74 Under section 1
74 Section 2 sets forth the "fundamental freedoms" of religion, expression, assembly, and
association; §§ 3 through 5 set forth political rights; § 6 sets forth mobility rights; §§ 7
through 14 set forth what are called legal rights, which essentially deal with fair procedures in
criminal cases; § 15 sets forth equality rights; and §§ 16 through 23 provide for language and
educational rights. The political rights sections guarantee every citizen the right to vote in an
election for members of the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly, and to be quali-
fied for membership therein. They also require that elections for the House of Commons and
for legislative assemblies be held at least every five years. These provisions have been relied
on to challenge bans on voting by persons convicted of crime. Compare Reynolds v. Attorney-
General of B.C., [1983] 2 W.W.R. 413 (B.C.S.C. 1982) (court invalidated a provincial law
that disqualified persons on probation from voting), with Re Jolivet & Barker & The Queen, I
D.L.R.4th 604 (B.C.S.C. 1983) (same court upheld a law prohibiting incarcerated persons
from voting). In the United States, "felon disqualification" laws have been held to be author-
ized specifically by § 2 of the fourteenth amendment, and so are immune from equal protec-
tion challenge. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
Under the language rights sections, English and French have co-equal status as the offi-
cial languages of Canada, and a person is entitled to use either language in a legal proceeding
or in communication with the federal government. Specific minority language educational
rights involve the right to have one's children receive primary and secondary school instruc-
tion in English and French. See P. Hoc, CANADA AcT, supra note 20, at 53-64; see generaly
Tetley, Language and Education Rights in Quebec and Canada (A Legislative Hisog and Personal
Political Dia), 45 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 177 (1982).
In Quebec Ass'n of Protestant School Bds. v. Attorney-General of Que., 1 D.L.R.4th 573,
(Que. Ct. App. 1983), aj'd, July, 1984, the court invalidated the controversial § 101 of the
Quebec French Language law, which restricted the right to instruction in English in Quebec
schools to children whose parents had received instruction in English in Quebec or who had
been in Quebec prior to August, 1977. The law would have denied children of Anglophonic
parents who had come to Quebec from elsewhere in Canada or abroad after August, 1977,
the right to receive instruction in English in Quebec. Such a denial was flatly inconsistent
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of the Charter, the rights set forth in sections 2 through 23 are pro-
tected against governmental action, "subject only to such reasonable
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society." Section 1 thus prescribes the mode of anal-
ysis to determine the constitutionality of governmental action impli-
cating the individual rights that are now entrenched in Canada.
A. Textual Entrenchment
The Charter of Rights differs in many significant respects from
the constitutional rights provisions of the United States Constitution.
The differences in the provisions protecting individual rights results
from the different natures of the two documents. In turn, this dissim-
ilarity exists because the Charter is a contemporary document,
promulgated when Canada is at an advanced stage of its legal and
political development.
Consider first the nature of the constitutional rights provisions of
the United States Constitution and the resultant role of the United
States Supreme Court in the development of constitutional protec-
tion of individual rights. It is an important part of the American
constitutional tradition that limitations on the exercise of govern-
mental power designed to protect individual rights generally be
broadly-phrased and open-ended 5 When the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights were promulgated, the United States was a new nation
in the initial stage of its legal and political development. Thus, there
was no American experience on which to build in framing limitations
on governmental power designed to protect individual rights.7 6 Pre-
cisely because the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment are
so broadly-phrased and were promulgated in the distant past, the
Constitution rarely answers current questions concerning individual
rights directly. In large measure, then, through its interpretation of
the Constitution, the Supreme Court has developed the constitu-
with the provisions of § 23(1)(b) of the Charter, which provides for continuity of language
instruction among family members who belong to the linguistic minority of a province.
75 Sedler, supra note 2, at 128-32.
76 Some of the limitations in the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights were
directed toward particular practices in colonial times that the framers found objectionable.
Such limitations would include the third amendment's prohibition against the quartering of
soldiers in private homes, the warrant specificity requirements of the fourth amendment,
which were directed against writs of assistance, and the fifth amendment's requirement of
grand jury indictment. Other limitations were imposed against the backdrop of English his-
tory, including the prohibition against suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in art. I, § 9(2),
the prohibition against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws in art. I, § 9(3) and art. I,
§ 10(1), and the requirements for proofof treason and the forfeiture limitations of art. III, § 3.
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tional protections of individual rights which exist in the United
States today.77
The Canadian Charter of Rights was promulgated in exactly
the opposite circumstances. Since the Charter of Rights is a contem-
porary document, the drafters of the Charter 78 could build on the
Canadian experience as they established a structure of constitutional
protection of individual rights. They could consider the relative im-
portance of particular individual rights in contemporary Canadian
77 See Sedler, supra note 2, at 109-20.
78 The term "drafters of the Charter" is used here in the same sense as the term "framers
of the Constitution" is used in the United States, and refers analytically to the particular
session of Parliament that passed the "Proposed Resolution for a Joint Address to Her Maj-
esty the Queen Respecting the Constitution of Canada," in December, 1981. This Resolution
contained the Canada Act, which included the Charter of Rights. The Charter of Rights
came about through the ordinary legislative process in Canada. The actual text of the Char-
ter was drafted by a committee of intermediate-level federal civil servants. See note 12 supra.
The Resolution containing the Canada Act was submitted to the Parliament of Canada as a
"government bill," and extensive hearings were held by a Special Joint Committee of the
Senate and of the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada. The bill was first
passed in April, 1981, and included certain amendments proposed by the Special Joint Com-
mittee, as well as some other amendments. This bill immediately came under court chal-
lenge, and after decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Reference re Resolution to
Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 (1981), the bill was further amended. The final
bill was passed in December, 1981, and was submitted as a resolution for action to the United
Kingdom Parliament. It was passed by the United Kingdom Parliament, and the Royal
Assent was given on March 29, 1982. See P. HoGG, CANADA ACT, supra note 20, at 1-3.
The proceedings of the Special Joint Committee have been published. Those proceed-
ings and the Parliamentary debates provide evidence of "the drafters' intent" in the same
manner as the Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention and Congressional debates pro-
vide evidence of "the framers' intent" in the United States. It is not clear how significant
evidence of "the drafters' intent" or other extrinsic evidence will be in litigation under the
Charter. As a general proposition, the Canadian courts, like the British courts do not con-
sider extrinsic evidence in the process of interpreting ordinary legislation. However, in consti-
tutional litigation involving ultra vires challenges, the Supreme Court of Canada has
permitted some use of extrinsic evidence, primarily to show the historical background of cer-
tain provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867, see Reference re: Authority of Parliament in
Relation to the Upper House, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 54, 66 (1979), and to show the factual context
and purpose of the legislation under challenge. See Re Residential Tenancies Act of Ont.,
[1981] 1 S.C.R. 713, 721 (1981); The Anti-Inflation Act Reference, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, 387-
91 (1976). In law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, slip op. (May 3, 1984), the first
Charter case decided by the Supreme Court of Canada, extrinsic evidence concerning the
history of the Charter provisions at issue was introduced by the parties. Justice Estey, writing
for the Court, commented on the Court's practice of "broadening the scope of the record in
constitutional matters," and noted that the earlier practice of excluding "historical material"
in constitutional cases had been disapproved in constitutional writings. He then went on to
say that while the Court had received the "historical material" in the present case, he did not
find it necessary to make use of it in arriving at the decision. He ended up by saying that, "I
do not wish to be taken in this appeal as determining one way or the other, the propriety in
the constitutional interpretative process of the admission of such material to the record." Slip
op. at 33-34.
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society. They could examine the extent of governmental interference
with individual rights in the past and the degree of protection that
the Canadian legal system had afforded to individual rights, even
absent entrenchment. They could look to the relationship between
Canada's values in the 1980's and long-standing traditions and prac-
tices, such as governmental aid to denominational schools. 79 And, of
course, they had to take into account the bicultural and bilingual
nature of the Canadian people.8 0 In addition, they could learn from
the constitutional experience of the United States and other nations,
as well as other efforts at legal protection of individual rights, such as
the European Charter of Rights. For all of these reasons, the drafters
were able to incorporate value choices and resolve a number of issues
concerning the nature and extent of individual rights in the text of
the Charter itself.
As a result, the Canadian Charter's clear language has resolved
a number of important constitutional questions that in the United
States have required extensive interpretation by the United States
Supreme Court, or have not even yet been fully resolved. For exam-
ple, only within the last decade has the Supreme Court interpreted
the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause to reach sex dis-
crimination. And the circumstances in which sex-based classifica-
tions may be constitutionally permissible are still subject to some
dispute.8' In Canada, however, section 15(1) and section 28 of the
Charter8 2 express a value choice of sex-based equality, and any sex-
based classification in Canadian law would have to satisfy a very
79 Governmental aid to denominational schools apparently existed at the time of Confed-
eration, and § 93(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867, protected existing rights with respect to
denominational schools. Section 2(a) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees only
"freedom of conscience and religion," and does not contain the "non-establishment" compo-
nent of the first amendment of the United States Constitution. Perhaps at least one of the
reasons for framing § 2(a)'s guarantee in terms of "freedom of conscience and religion" was to
avoid any implication that governmental aid to denominational schools or other traditional
forms of governmental involvement with religion would be unconstitutional.
80 Thus, the Charter contains guarantees of language rights and minority language edu-
cational rights. See note 73 supra. Section 27 also provides that "This Charter shall be inter-
preted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural
heritage of Canadians."
81 See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Michael M. v.
Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
82 Section 15(1) expressly includes discrimination based on sex in the list of prohibited
discriminations. Section 28 provides that "Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the
rights and freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and female persons."
The effect of§ 28 is to avoid the three-year delay the coming into force of § 15, as provided in
§ 32(2), and to exempt sex-based discrimination from the override provisions of § 33. Thus,
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heavy burden of justification.83 Similarly, the constitutional contro-
versy in the United States over the permissibility of "affirmative ac-
tion" programs84 will not arise in Canada, because section 15(2) of
the Charter specifically authorizes affirmative action programs.8 5
A number of the legal rights provisions of the Charter likewise
provide textual answers to many questions about constitutionally re-
quired procedures in criminal cases. Similar questions have required
extensive litigation and Supreme Court interpretation in the United
States. In some instances, it is apparent that the drafters examined
the American constitutional experience, drawing certain ideas from
it, and rejecting others. For example, section 8 of the Charter tracks
the fourth amendment in providing that "[e]verybody has the right
to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure, '8 6 but does not
include the fourth amendment's specificity of the warrant and prob-
able cause requirements.8 7 On the other hand, section 10(b) of the
all sex-based discrimination is subject to immediate challenge under the Charter, and uncon-
stitutional sex-based discrimination is not subject to override.
The question would still exist as to whether certain laws or governmental action dis-
advantaging some women because of their sex violates the Charter. The United States Supreme
Court has held that discrimination against pregnant women, such as denying them benefits
available to other employees, does not constitute discrimination on the basis of sex within the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, or come within the ambit of
federal laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S 125 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). The Canadian courts have also
held that the denial of social insurance benefits to pregnant women did not violate the prohi-
bition against sex discrimination contained in the Canadian Bill of Rights. See Stuart v.
Attorney-General of Can., 44 N.R. 320 (Fed. Ct. App. 1982); Bliss v. Attorney-General of
Can., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183 (1978). Whether the Canadian courts would reach the same result
under the Charter is still an open question.
83 Professor Hogg suggests that in light of § 28, all sex-based classifications could be held
unconstitutional. This would be so if § 28 has the effect of preventing the operation of the
limitation provisions of § 1. See P. HOGG, CANADA ACT, supra note 20, at 72.
84 In the American constitutional context, "affirmative action" refers to the express use of
race-conscious criteria to benefit racial minorities or of gender-conscious criteria to benefit
women. See, e.g., FuIlilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351
(1974).
85 Section 15(2) provides: "Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activ-
ity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups
including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour,
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability." The only type of challenge that could be
raised to an affirmative action program, in light of the text of § 15(2), is whether its object
may properly be seen as "the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or
groups." Presumably, legislative bodies would have wide latitude in this regard.
86 In this respect, the fourth amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be violated .. "
87 Mr. Manning suggests that one reason why the drafters may have omitted these re-
quirements is that they considered them to be redundant. Warrant requirements have long
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Charter, which requires that a suspect be informed of the right to
counsel upon arrest, effectively adopts one element of the American
Miranda rule.88
Moreover, the legal rights provisions provide textual answers to
many questions of constitutionally-required procedures in criminal
cases that are very different from the way that such questions have
been answered in the United States. In this regard, they reflect dif-
ferent value choices about the degree of protection that should be
afforded persons accused of crime.8 9 For example, in Canada the
right to the assistance of counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter is
limited to the right to obtain counsel; there is no constitutional obli-
gation on the government under this section to provide counsel for
indigents. Likewise, the guarantee against double jeopardy is nar-
rower in Canada than in the United States; under section 11(h),
jeopardy does not attach until the accused has been "finally acquit-
ted." This section would appear to permit the government to appeal
from a judgment of acquittal and to always allow a retrial following
a mistrial. 9°
existed in Canadian law, and it could be contended that these requirements were subsumed
in the general prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. A contrary interpreta-
tion would be that the drafters intended to avoid problems with probable cause. In any
event, the textual standard is that of "unreasonable search or seizure," and questions relating
to the specificity of the warrant and of probable cause will be resolved within the framework
of that standard. See M. MANNING, RIGHTS, FREEDOMS AND THE COURTS 275-79 (1983).
Professor Hogg suggests that another reason for omitting these requirements from § 8 is
that they textually would render unconstitutional any use of writs of assistance. The abuse of
writs of assistance in the colonial period was an abuse with which the framers of the fourth
amendment were familiar, but such writs are still authorized in Canada. See P. HOGG, CA-
NADA AcT, supra note 20 at 29-30. Professor Hogg, however, subsequently has taken the posi-
tion that writs of assistance are "almost certain to be held invalid." Hogg, Canada's New
Charter of Rights, 32 AM. J. COMp. L. 283, 291 (1984). See The Queen v. Carriere, 4 C.C.R. 97
(Ont. Prov. Ct. 1983), where a lower court in Ontario held that the use of writs of assistance
constituted an unreasonable search and seizure under § 8 and violated the "Fundamental
principles of justice" provisions of § 7.
88 See P. HOGG, CANADA AcT, supra note 20, at 33-34.
89 According to the government, the theory of the legal rights provisions is that they
basically entrench existing law and practice, and that "most of [these rights] already exist in
Canada by precedent and practice, or ordinary statute law." THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND
FREEDOMS: A GUIDE FOR CANADIANS 12 (1982). Our reference to textual answers to ques-
tion of constitutionally-required procedures in criminal cases is to the provisions of §§ 8-14,
which deal specifically with the rights of the criminal accused. Additional protections for the
criminal accused may be found to inhere in the "fundamental principles of justice" provision
of § 7. See M. MANNING, RIGHTS, FREEDOMS AND THE COURTS at 227-32, 267-71.
90 Professor Hogg states: "The word 'finally' in S. 11 (h) makes clear that the provision
does not preclude a retrial ordered by reason of some error at the original trial." P. HOGG,
CANADA AcT, supra note 20, at 45. See Re Burrows and The Queen, 150 D.L.R.3d 317 (Man.
Ct. App. 1983), leave to appeal refused, June 20, 1983, where part way through the accused's first
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The Charter also treats incriminating evidence differently than
does the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the fifth
amendment's self-incrimination guarantee. Under section 11 (c) an
accused may not be compelled to be a witness at his trial. And sec-
tion 13 protects a witness who has testified from having any incrimi-
nating evidence in that testimony used against him in any other
proceeding, except in a prosecution for perjury.9' But the Charter
does not protect generally the right to refuse to answer a question in
any proceeding on the basis of possible self-incrimination. 92 In con-
trast, this right plays an important role in the privilege against self-
incrimination in the United States.93 Finally, section 11 (f) provides
that the right to trial by jury exists only when the maximum punish-
ment prescribed for the offense is at least five years. This provision
avoids the "petty offense" problem that has arisen in the United
trial, the government realized it had laid the wrong charge and dismissed the proceedings. It
then laid a new information charging a proper offense, which was held not to violate the
accused's rights under § 11 (h). In Canada, the government can appeal from a verdict of
acquittal in a criminal case, and a conviction against the accused may be entered by the
appellate court. See Morgentaler v. The Queen [1976] 1 S.C.R. 616 (1975) (jury verdict of
acquittal of physician on charge of performing an illegal abortion set aside on appeal and
conviction entered against physician). For a broader view of the extent of protection afforded
by § 11 (h), see M. MANNING, RIGHTS, FREEDOMS AND THE CouRTs 424-29 (1983). In the
United States, of course, the government cannot appeal, and there can be no retrial, regard-
less of any error at the original trial. See, e.g., Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962);
cf. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978). In some circumstances, a retrial may be barred
following the grant of the prosecution's motion for a mistrial. Compare United States v. Jorn,
400 U.S. 470 (1971), with Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
91 This provision resembles use immunity in the United States. See Pye, The Rights of
Persons AccusedofCrme Under the Canadian Constitution. A Comparative Perspective, 45 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 221, 235-36 (1982). In Donald v. Law Society of British Columbia, 2 D.L.R.4th
385 (B.C. Ct. App. 1983), the court held that the ban on the introduction of incriminating
evidence was not limited to subsequent criminal proceedings, and so prevented the use of
testimony in a prior civil proceedings in subsequent disciplinary proceedings.
92 Again, this is under § 11(c) and § 13. It is possible that § 7 will be interpreted as
protecting the right to refuse to disclose incriminating evidence, at least in some circum-
stances. In R.L. Crian, Inc. v. Couture, Sask. Q.B. (Dec. 19, 1983) (unreported), a lower
court in Saskatchewan held that it would violate "fundamental principles ofjustice" to com-
pel a person under administrative investigation to provide incriminating evidence to the in-
vestigating officials, because such evidence could be used against him in a subsequent
criminal prosecution.
93 Set, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511
(1967). Since there is no right under the Charter to refuse to answer a question on the basis of
possible self-incrimination, a party charged with being an accessory after the fact, who is
being tried separately, can be compelled to testify as to the transaction in issue at the trial of
the principal. See The Queen v. Bleich, 150 D.L.R.3d 600 (Man. Q.B. 1983), and an attorney
can be compelled to testify in bar disciplinary proceedings against him. See Re James and
Law Society of British Columbia, 143 D.L.R.3d 379 (B.C.S.C. 1982).
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States under the sixth amendment's broad trial by jury guarantee.94
Thus, unlike the United States Constitution, the Charter, to some
considerable degree, specifically defines the nature and extent of the
procedural rights afforded to persons charged with crimes.95
Section 6, dealing with mobility rights, also exemplifies how the
Charter textually resolves issues that had to be resolved by extensive
constitutional interpretation in the United States. Section 6 specifi-
cally recognizes: (1) a right to travel outside of Canada and a con-
comitant right to return;96 (2) a right to inter-provincial travel,
including a right to take up residence in any province;97 and (3) a
right to pursue a livelihood in any province.98 However, contrary to
94 It is now settled that the offense is "petty" where the sentence authorized for the of-
fense is not more than six months' imprisonment, see Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66
(1969), or in the case of criminal contempt, where the sentence actually imposed is less then
six months. See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974).
95 Professor Pye notes that the right to confrontation and the right to compulsory process
are surprisingly absent from the Charter, and that a proposal to include such protections was
defeated. See Pye, supra note 93, at 246; for a discussion of the Charter's legal rights provi-
sions, see generally Ratushny, Emerging Issues in Relation to the Legal Rights of a Suspect Under the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 61 CAN. B. REV. 177 (1983); M. MANNING, RIGHTS,
FREEDOMS AND THE COURTS 227-457 (1983).
96 The right to tr.vel outside of the United States and to return is a part of the "liberty"
protected by the due process clause. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964);
compare Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), with Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
97 In the United States, the right to interstate travel has been found in the internal infer-
ences of the Constitution, as a right "fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union."
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
98 In the United States, the right of non-residents to pursue a livelihood in another state
is protected by the privileges and immunities clause of art. IV, § 2. See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437
U.S. 518 (1978). The Charter of Rights does not contain the equivalency of a privileges and
immunities clause, and apart from the right to pursue a livelihood in another province, a non-
resident is not protected from discriminatory provincial laws, such as those barring landhold-
ing by non-residents. See Morgan v. Attorney-General of Prince Edward Island, [1976] 2
S.C.R. 349 (1975); P. HOGG, CANADA ACT, supra note 20, at 25. A challenge to such discrimi-
nation possibly could be mounted under the equal protection provisions of § 15(1), but it
probably would not be successful. See Storey v. Zazelenchuk, 5 C.R.R. 99 (Sask. Q.B. 1982),
in which the court held that since § 6 did not deal with voting rights, a six month durational
residency requirement for voting in provincial elections did not violate § 6. A durational
residency requirement of similar length would violate the constitutional right to travel in the
United States. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). In Law Society of Upper Canada
v. Skapinker, slip. op. (May 3, 1984), the first case in which the Supreme Court of Canada
rendered a decision under the Charter, that Court held that the "right to pursue the gaining
of a livelihood in any province," within the meaning of § 6(2)(b) was not a "free-standing"
right, but was limited to the right to work in a province other than the province of a person's
present or previous residence. Therefore, that provision could not be relied on to challenge an
Ontario law requiring that all persons seeking to practice law in Ontario be a Canadian
citizen or other British subject. See also Basile v. Attorney-General of Nova Scotia, 148
D.L.R.3d 382 (N.S.S.C. Trial 1983) (provincial law providing that only permanent residents
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the constitutional rule in the United States, 9 9 section 6(3)(b) specifi-
cally authorizes reasonable residency requirements as qualifications
for receipt of publicly-funded social services. Also, section 6(4) per-
mits a province to require employment preference for social or eco-
nomically disadvantaged residents where the rate of employment in
that province falls below the general rate of employment in
Canada. 100
Even some of the Charter's provisions that appear broadly-
phrased and open-ended differ in some respects from comparable
provisions of the United States Constitution. For example, section 7
provides that, "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of
the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accord-
ance with principles of fundamental justice." While this provision is
similar to the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments, it pointedly omits property rights from the list of protected
rights. This omission ensures that section 7 could not be relied on to
require compensation or even fair procedures for a taking of property
by the government.' 0 The omission also means that "procedural
due process requirements" 0 2 will not apply to Canadian governmen-
tal action affecting property interests. 0 3 The specific omission of
property interests from the list of protected rights under section 7
may indicate that contemporary Canadian society does not consider
property interests an important area of individual rights. 10 4
of Nova Scotia can be licensed as direct sellers is a "reasonable limit prescribed by law," and
so does not violate § 6(2)(b)).
99 See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
100 See P. HOGG, CANADA AcT, supra note 20, at 25-26.
101 See id at 26.
102 See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp, 395 U.S. 337 (1969); North Georgia Finish-
ing v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
103 However, it is possible that entitlement to social welfare benefits in Canada will be
held to involve "security of the person" within the meaning of § 7, so as to bring into play
"fair hearing" requirements before such benefits can be denied or taken away. Cf Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
104 A more prosaic reason for the omission of property interests from the list of protected
rights under § 7, according to one Canadian colleague, was that the provinces wanted to be
free from any constitutional constraint when exercising the power to expropriate property.
But see Queen in Right of N.B. v. Fisherman's Wharf, Ltd., 135 D.L.R.3d 307 (N.B.Q.B.
1982), atfdon other grounds, 144 D.L.R.3d 21 (N.B. Ct. App. 1983), in which a trial court in
New Brunswick held that § 7's guarantee of "security of the person" could encompass the
right to enjoyment of property ownership. The case involved a seizure of property on which a
party delinquent in his remission of provincial sales taxes held a lien. The court held that
under the sales tax collection statute, the lien did not attach to property not owned by the
delinquent seller. The court stated that its interpretation of the statute was with regard to the
provision of § 7, which it saw as prohibiting the confiscation without compensation of the
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The particular language of section 7 differs from the language of
the due process clauses in at least two other ways. First, the language
of section 7 sets forth the protected right in conjunctive terms. It says
that everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of the person,
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with
"principles of fundamental justice." Second, it uses the term "princi-
ples of fundamental justice" rather than the term "due process of
law." In other contexts in Canada, the term "principles of funda-
mental justice" has been construed to mean "fair procedures." 0 5 Ac-
cording to the government officials who drafted the text of the
Charter, the term "principles of fundamental justice" would mean
the same as "procedural due process" in the United States and would
not cover the concept of what is called substantive due process,
which would impose substantive requirements as to the policy in
question."' 10 6 It has been suggested that the most natural reading of
section 7, in light of its express conjunctive language, is that the first
clause imposes substantive limitations on governmental power to in-
terfere with life, liberty, and security of the person, while the second
clause imposes procedural limitation on such interference.1 0 7 If sec-
tion 7 is so interpreted, despite the difference between the language
property of a person other than the delinquent seller for the purpose of collecting a tax.
Whether the court's interpretation of § 7's guarantee of "security of the person" as including
the enjoyment of property ownership will be followed by other courts is problematical. The
New Brunswick Court of Appeals resolved the question without reference to § 7. But see M.
MANNING, RIGHTS, FREEDOMS AND THE COURTS 249-52 (1983).
105 The term "fundamental justice" appears in § 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights, and
in that context has been defined to mean "that the tribunal which adjudicates upon his rights
must act fairly, in good faith, without bias and in a judicial temper, and must give to him the
opportunity adequately to state his case." Duke v. The Queen [1972] S.C.R. 917, 923 (1972)
(Fauteux, C.J.). The term "fundamental justice" has been said to mean "natural justice,"
which does have an established meaning in Canadian law, but is limited to "rules of fair
procedure." P. HOGG, CANADA ACT, supra note 20, at 27; W. TARNOPOLSKY, THE CANADIAN
BILL OF RIGHTS 264 (2d ed. 1975).
106 Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of SpecialJoint Committee of the Senate and of the House of
Commons on the Constitution of Canada, First Session of the Thirty-second Parliament, 1980-81,
46:32 (1981) (statement of B. L. Strayer, Ass't Dep. Min., Dep't of Justice). As to the rele-
vance in constitutional litigation of "drafters' intent," see note 78 supra. Mr. Manning, how-
ever maintains that the term, "principles of fundamental justice," is not limited to "fair
procedures," and that it means something different than "natural justice" or "procedural due
process." His position is that section 7 authorizes the courts to "test the substantive content of
legislation." M. MANNING, RIGHTS, FREEDOMS, AND THE COURTS 232, 255-71 (1983).
107 Bender, supra note 11, at 824-25, 843-46. Professor Hogg, on the other hand, appar-
ently assumes that section 7 creates a single, "process-type" right. He states: "[t]he courts
could review the appropriateness and fairness of the procedures enacted for a deprivation of
life, liberty or security of the person-but that is all. The courts could not review the substan-
tive justification for the deprivation." P. HOGG, CANADA AT, supra note 20, at 27.
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of section 7 and the due process clauses, section 7 would operate the
same way that the due process clauses have operated in the United
States. It would also authorize the Canadian courts to review fully
the substantive content of all laws implicating individual rights. On
the other hand, it is possible that despite the conjunctive language of
section 7, the Supreme Court of Canada will treat section 7 as creat-
ing a single right-the right not to be deprived of life, liberty, or
security of the person except in accordance with "principles of funda-
mental justice."108 If section 7 is interpreted as creating a single,
"process-type" right, then the use of the term "fundamental princi-
ples ofjustice" rather than "due process of law" in section 7 may turn
out to be quite significant, and section 7 will not have the same sub-
stantive import as the due process clauses have in the United
States.10 9
108 In The Queen v. Hayden, [1983] 6 W.W.R. 665 (Man. Ct. App. 1983), leave to appeal
refused, Dec. 19, 1983, the court so interpreted section 7 and held that section 7 could not be
relied on to invalidate a provision of the Federal Indian Act, making it an offense for a person
to be intoxicated on an Indian reserve. The court stated:
[t]he phrase "principles of fundamental justice," in the context of s. 7 and the Char-
ter as a whole, does not go beyond the requirement of fair procedure and was not
intended to cover substantive requirements as to the policy of the law in question.
To hold otherwise would require all legislative enactments creating offenses to be
submitted to the test of whether they offend the principles of fundamental justice.
In other words, the policy of the law as determined by the legislature would be
measured against judicial policy of what offends fundamental justice. In terms of
procedural fairness, that is an acceptable area for judicial review but it should not,
in my view, be extended to consider the substance of offense created. Id at 657.
The Court held that the provision violated § l(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights because it
was not an offense to be intoxicated anywhere else than on the Indian reserve. The provision
effectively amounted to racial discrimination.
109 However, even if section 7 is interpreted as creating a single, "process-type" right, this
does not mean that in some circumstances, section 7 may not be relied on to review the
"substantive validity" of legislation. In Reference re § 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act RSBC
1979, c. 288, [1983] 3 W.W.R. 756, 763-64 (B.C. Ct. App. 1983), the British Columbia Court
of Appeals stated that the term "principles of fundamental justice" was not restricted to mat-
ters of procedures, but extended to the "substantive validity" of the law as well. At issue in
that case was the validity of a criminal statute imposing absolute liability for driving while
prohibited or suspended. The court construed the statute as foreclosing the accused from
proving that his action in driving was due to an honest and reasonable mistake or that he
acted without guilty intent. As so construed, the statute was held to violate § 7. This type of
statute illustrates the situation where "procedure" and "substance" blend. The case is similar
to American cases such as Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), in which the Supreme Court
invalidated a statute providing for the automatic suspension of the vehicle registration and
driver's license of an uninsured motorist involved in an accident, unless the motorist posted
security to cover the damages claimed by the other parties. In Wisconsin v. Costantineau,
400 U.S. 433 (1971), the Supreme Court invalidated a statute authorizing state officials, with-
out notice or hearing, to declare a person an "excessive drinker" and post a notice in retail
liquor stores that sales of liquor were prohibited to that person. The fundamental unfairness
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So too, section 2(a) of the Charter, dealing with religious free-
dom, omits a non-establishment component. Presumably, this omis-
sion was designed to protect from constitutional challenge the long-
standing Canadian practice of governmental financial assistance to
denominational schools and other traditional forms of governmental
involvement with religion. In any event, while the establishment of
religion and religious freedom are interrelated," t0 the section 2(a)
provision for "freedom of conscience and religion" allows govern-
mental action aiding religion so long it does not interfere with an
individual's religious freedom."'
in these cases has "procedural" as well as "substantive" overtones, because the adversely af-
fected person is denied the opportunity to contest the basis for the imposition of the sanction.
Similarly, the person who has been held absolutely liable for driving with a suspended or
revoked license has been denied the opportunity to show justification for his behavior. It is
the denial of the opportunity to show justification that violates "principles of fundamental
justice," and renders the law substantively unconstitutional. In commenting on this case, the
court in Hayden noted: "What the court decided in that case was that it was contrary to the
principles of fundamental justice to enact a limitation on a substantive offence of driving
while suspended by taking away the defences of honest or reasonable mistake of fact and lack
of guilty intent. The court did not decide that it was unconstitutional to create an offence
with penal consequences of driving while suspended." 6 W.W.R. at 657. See also The Queen
v. Willeneuve, 4 C.R.R. 1 (Ont. Ct. App. 1983), leave to appealgranted, June 6, 1983 (provisions
of federal criminal law to the effect that an honest mistake as to the age of a female under 14
furnished no defense to a charge of having sex with an underage female, did not violate § 7).
110 That interrelationship is clearest when governmental action aiding religion impacts on
individuals holding "non-religious" views, as in the bible-reading and school prayer cases. See
School Dist. v. Schempp, 372 U.S. 203, 217-22 (1963). Nevertheless, even in that situation,
the non-establishment concern and the religious freedom concern can be differentiated. See
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-33 (1962).
111 The clearest example of such action would be governmental financial assistance to
denominational schools. The absence of an establishment component in § 2(a) will also pre-
vent constitutional challenge in Canada to practices such as the use of chaplains in legislative
bodies, which the United States Supreme Court has upheld against establishment clause chal-
lenge. See Marsh v. Chambers, 104 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
In The Queen v. Big M Drug Mar, [1984] 1 W.W.R. 625 (Alta. Ct. App. 1983), the
court, in a 3-2 decision, held that the federal Lord's Day Act violated § 2(a) of the Charter,
because the main purpose of the law was the religious one of compelling observance of the
Christian sabbath. The majority concluded that unlike the situation in American states, see
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1966), the passage of time did not convert the purpose
of the law from a religious one to a secular one. The analysis stayed within the framework of
"freedom of conscience and religion," by focusing on the burden that the law imposed on
those who did not observe Sunday as the sabbath. The court stated: "For those whose reli-
gion requires observance of a different Sabbath, this is said to produce at the very least an
economic disincentive to the practice of their own religion and at worst a coercive atmosphere
in which the nation is perceived to require all its citizens to observe the Christian Sunday."
Id at 641. The conclusion, therefore, was that the law "imposes a coercive burden on the free
exercise of religion or conscience." Id at 643. The dissenting judges noted the absence of a
non-establishment component in § 2(a), and emphasized that the law did not have the effect
of compelling anyone to observe Sunday as the sabbath. Id. at 659. Their conclusion was
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Because the Charter of Rights is a contemporary document, re-
flecting Canada's advanced stage of legal and political development,
the drafters could incorporate certain value choices into the docu-
ment. While some of the Charter's provisions, such as the fundamen-
tal freedoms guarantees of section 2, are broadly-phrased and open-
ended like their American counterparts, many of the Charter's provi-
sions specifically define the nature and extent of the protection pro-
vided. Thus, the answers to many present or future constitutional
questions in Canada may be found in the text of the Charter. Even if
the answers are not explicit in the Charter, the Canadian courts in
many cases will only need to apply fairly specific constitutional pro-
visions to particular factual situations.112
B. Textual and Structural Analsis
The structure and text of the Charter also prescribe the mode of
analysis for questions of constitutional protection of individual rights.
As discussed previously, sections 2 through 23 of the Charter set forth
the individual rights that are entrenched and thus constitutionally
protected from governmental action. Section 1 provides that those
rights are guaranteed, "subject only to such reasonable limits pre-
scribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and demo-
cratic society."
The first step in analyzing a constitutional challenge in Canada
is to determine whether the individual right implicated by the law or
governmental action comes within the Charter's protection. In other
that "a law having a religious purpose or effect will violate the Charter only if its objective or
effect is to oppress or interfere with religious liberty." Id. at 664.
In Regina v. Quinlan, 60 N.S.R.2d 224 (N.S. County Ct. 1983), a lower court in Nova
Scotia held that a provincial law prohibiting the setting of lobster traps in certain areas on
Sunday, but not in other areas, violated § 2(a). The court concluded that the prohibition
"served the religious conscience" of the persons residing in the prohibited areas, and thus
discriminated against persons whose religious faith did not call for the observance of the
sabbath on Sunday. See also Brown v. Brown, 3 D.L.R.4th 283 (Sask. Ct. App. 1982) (custo-
dial parent has the right to determine religious education of children over objection of non-
custodial parent); Re B, 2 C.R.R. 329 (Alta. Prov. Ct. 1982) (state can compel blood transfu-
sion for child whose parents had refused consent on religious grounds).
112 In the first Charter case coming before the Supreme Court of Canada, Law Society of
Upper Canada v. Skapinker, slip. op. (May 3, 1984), the issue before the Court was whether
the "right to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province" within the meaning of
§ 6(2)(b), was a "free standing" right, so as to enable an Ontario resident to challenge an
Ontario law regulating the practice of law, or whether it was limited to the right to work in a
province other than the province of a person's present or previous residence. The Court re-
solved that question with reference to the location of § 6(2)(b) in the mobility rights part of
the Charter, and concluded that the right was a limited one, protecting only new residents or
non-residents.
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words, the asserted individual right must be specifically guaranteed
in the text of sections 2 through 23. This step in the constitutional
analysis resembles the United States Supreme Court's process of de-
fining constitutional phrases, such as "freedom of speech."1 13 If the
Canadian court concludes that the asserted right does not come
within the protection of the rights guaranteed by sections 2 through
23, then that right is not entrenched. For example, in Law Society of
Upper Canada v. Skapinker, 1 4 the first Charter case decided by the
Supreme Court of Canada, the Court concluded that the right to
"pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province," guaranteed by
section 6(2)(6), was not a "free standing" right; rather, it was related
to the right to "move to and take up residence in any province,"
guaranteed by section 6(2) (a), and so was only for the benefit of non-
residents wishing to work in a province other than the province of
their present or previous residence. Therefore, the right asserted in
that case by a permanent resident living in Ontario, to practice law
in Ontario, did not come within the protection of section 6(2)(b).
Likewise, if the Canadian courts held that "obscenity" did not consti-
tute "freedom of expression" within the meaning of section 2(b) of
the Charter, then any governmental prohibition of "obscenity" law
would not be subject to constitutional challenge under section
2(b).11 5
The Charter also specifically defines the extent of protection af-
113 See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.
425 U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial speech is "speech"); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S.
229 (1963) (peaceful demonstrations constitute "speech"); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957) ("obscenity" is not "speech"); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)
("fighting words" do not constitute "speech"); see also In re Southam Inc. and The Queen
(No. 1), 41 Ont. 2d 113 (Ont. Ct. App. 1983) (public access to courts within the protection of
§ 2(b) of the Charter); Canadian Newspapers Co. v. The Queen, 47 B.C.R. 150 (B.C.S.C.
1983) (same); cf R. v. G.B., [1983] 3 W.W.R. 141 (Alta. Q.B. 1983) (public access to courts
not within the protection of § 2(b), but a statutory requirement mandating that all juvenile
trials be held in camera would violate the "public hearing" guarantee of § 11 (d)). The United
States Supreme Court has grounded the right of public access to trials in the first amendment.
See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). The right is not grounded
in the sixth amendment's public trial guarantee. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S.
368 (1979).
114 See note 98 supra.
115 Section 2(a) presents similar issues with respect to the meaning of "freedom of con-
science and religion." The United States Supreme Court has held that the "free exercise of
religion" within the meaning of the first amendment includes the freedom to act in accor-
dance with one's religion as well as freedom to believe. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972). It also includes the right not to be subject to "unreasonable burdens" on the
exercise of one's religion. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). These types of
issues will have to be resolved by Canadian courts in determining whether religious-based
claims come within the protection of § 2(a). See The Queen v. Big M Drug Mart, [1984] 1
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forded some individual rights. For example, section 10(b) defines the
right to counsel as the right to "retain and instruct counsel." Thus,
indigent defendants in Canada would have no constitutional right
under this section to the appointment of counsel at government ex-
pense. And the right to take up residence in any province, guaran-
teed by section 6(2)(a), does not guarantee immediate receipt of
publicly provided social services."l 6
Having fit the claimed individual right within one of the Char-
ter's guarantees, the second step -in the constitutional analysis is to
apply the section 1 criteria to determine whether the restriction of
that right was valid. 1 7 The restriction violates the Charter, and is
therefore unconstitutional, '18 unless it constitutes a "reasonable limit
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and dem-
ocratic society." The clear thrust of section 1 is to place the burden
of justification for the restriction on the government."19 The court
W.W.R. 625 (Alta. Ct. App. 1983); [1969] S.C.R. 383 (1969). See also M. MANNING, RIGHTS
FREEDOMS AND THE COURTS 197-204 (1983).
116 Contrast this to the right to travel guarantee in the United States. See note 99 supra.
117 See the discussion of the two-step analysis in Re Federal Republic of Germany and
Rauca, 41 Ont. 2d 225, 240 (Ont. Ct. App. 1983). The court noted that the first step in the
analysis is to determine whether the guaranteed right or freedom has been "infringed,
breached, or denied." If the answer to that question is affirmative, then the question becomes
whether the denial or limitation of the right "is a reasonable one demonstrably justifiable in a
free and democratic society."
Some of the rights guaranteed by the Charter are of such a nature that the question of
"demonstrable justification" is subsumed in the question of whether a violation has occurred.
Such rights would include § 8's guarantee against unreasonable search or seizure, § 10's arrest
rights, § 1 I's rights to be informed of the specific offense without unreasonable delay, to be
tried within a reasonable time, and not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause, and
§ 12's protection against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. Other rights are of
such a specific nature as not to be subject to a "demonstrable justification" limitation. These
include the right to habeas corpus under § 10(c), the right not to be compelled to testify
under § 11 (c), the right to the presumption of innocence under § 11(c), the right to trial by
jury under § 11(0, the non-retroactivity protection of § 11 (g), the double jeopardy protection
§ 11 (h), the non-variation of penalty protection of § I 1(1), the non-use of incriminating evi-
dence guarantee of§ 13, the right to an interpreter under § 14, and the language and minor-
ity language education rights of §§ 16-23. For a discussion of the specificity of the minority
language education rights as foreclosing any "demonstrable justification" limitation, see Que-
bec Ass'n of Protestant School Bds. v. Attorney-General of Que., supra note 74, at 576.
118 See note 26 supra.
119 This was the intention of the drafters. As stated in testimony before the Special
Committee:
[I]t was the belief of the drafters that by going to these words demonstrably justified
or can be demonstrably justified, it was making clear that the onus would be on the
government, or whoever is trying to justify the action that limited the rights set out
in the charter, the onus would be on them to show that the limit which was being
imposed not only was reasonable, which was in the first draft, but also that it was
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must determine whether the restriction is "reasonable," 120 whether it
is "prescribed by law," 12' and whether it comports with the limita-
tions on individual freedom properly imposed in a "free and demo-
cratic society." In considering the third criterion, the court would
presumably consider the acceptability of the restriction in Canadian
society, and the existence of similar restrictions in other democratic
societies, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Com-
monwealth nations such as Australia and New Zealand.122
The United States Constitution, in contrast, provides no struc-
tural or textual guidance for the courts in examining the validity of
restrictions that implicate constitutional rights. The Supreme Court
has had to develop the entire mode of constitutional analysis on its
own. For example, since the terms of the first amendment are abso-
lute, the Court has had to fashion an extensive body of doctrine de-
fining permissible restrictions on expression.' 23 Likewise, the Court
has chosen to analyze due process and equal protection challenges
with an articulated two-tiered standard of review.' 24
It would not be proper for the Canadian courts to analyze con-
stitutional challenges in this manner. Once a particular activity is
held to constitute "freedom of expression," within the meaning of
section 2(b), for example, the Canadian courts can only determine
the validity of the restriction on that activity in accordance with the
section 1 criteria.1 25 Likewise, in an equal protection challenge, sec-
justifiable or justified, and in doing that they would have to show that in relation to
the situation being dealt with, the limit was justifiable.
AMinutes of Proceedings and Evidence of SpecialJoint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons
on the Constitution of Canada, First Session of the Thirty-second Parliament, 1980-81, 48:45
(1981) (statement of B. L. Strayer, Ass't Dep. Min., Dep't of Justice). In re Southam and The
Queen, 41 Ont. 2d 113 (Ont. Ct. App. 1983), the court stated, "[t]he complete burden of
proving an exception under § I of the Charter rests on the party claiming the benefit of the
exception or limitation." Id. at 124-25. See Hunter v. Southam, Inc., - S.C.R. -, Sept. 17,
1984 affirming this proposition.
120 See P. HOGG, CANADA AcT, supra note 20, at 10; M. MANNING, RIGHTS, FREEDOMS
AND THE COURTS 145-47 (1983).
121 See P. HOGG, CANADA AcT, supra note 20, at 10-11. In re Ont. Film & Video Appreci-
ation Soc'y and Ont. Bd. of Censors, 45 Ont. 2d 80 (Ont. Ct. App. 1984), the court invali-
dated a film censorship law which contained no standards to determine when a license to
show a film could be refused, on the ground that written standards were necessary to satisfy
the requirement of "reasonable limits prescribed by law."
122 Id
123 While the Court has adopted a general "ad hoc" balancing approach, it has developed
a number of specific doctrines, such as void on its face, prior restraint, and content neutrality,
to determine the validity of particular kinds of restrictions on expression.
124 Some members of the Court, however, have contended that in practice the Court em-
ploys a "sliding scale" standard of review. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
125 In deciding whether a particular restriction is reasonable, the Canadian courts could
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tion 15 would not permit differing standards of review for certain
"suspect" classifications. All forms of discrimination which section
15 textually proscribes are considered of equal importance. And sec-
tion 1 sets forth the standard of review for determining the validity of
particular forms of discrimination.' 26
The Charter also deals specifically with the admissibility of evi-
dence obtained by an illegal search and seizure. Section 24(2)
prescribes a discretionary exclusionary rule. The court may exclude
the evidence if, "having regard to all the circumstances, the admis-
sion of it in the proceedings would bring the administration ofjustice
into disrepute." Thus, there is an explicit standard for examining the
admissibility of illegally obtained evidence, and the court need only
apply that standard to the particular facts. 127
incorporate some of the specific first amendment doctrines promulgated by the United States
Supreme Court. For example, like the United States Supreme Court, they could hold that a
prior restraint is a "reasonable limit" only in the most exceptional circumstances. See, e.g.,
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (197 1). They could require that any law
which regulates expression be drawn with narrow specificity, and hold any law not so drawn
"void on its face." See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971). Similarly, they could
hold that any law regulating the "time, place and manner" of expression is not a "reasonable
limit" unless it is completely content-neutral. See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972). These kinds of questions must be resolved within the analytical framework of deter-
mining whether a particular restriction can be reasonably justified. This analytical frame-
work focuses on the "reasonableness" of the particular limit, with the burden on the
government to establish such "reasonableness." The kind of "ad hoc balancing approach"
employed by the United States Supreme Court in dealing with the general permissibility of
restrictions on freedom of expression is not authorized under § 1. For example, in Colten v.
Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972), the Supreme Court considered the nature of a particular
expression-which it characterized as "arguing with a policeman"--to be of a relatively low
level, and, balancing the individual's interest in carrying on that type of expression against
the state's asserted "crowd control" interest, it struck the balance in favor of the restriction. If
a Canadian court were faced with a similar question, it would have to focus entirely on the
reasonableness of the particular restriction and could not discount the quality of the individ-
ual's admittedly protected expression in resolving the "reasonableness" question.
126 On the other hand, where a challenge was made to a general classification contained
in legislation, e.g., a classification among welfare recipients as denying the disfavored group
equal protection and equal benefit of the law, it would not be texlually impermissible for the
Canadian courts to vary the degree of scrutiny, depending on the importance of the individ-
ual interest, as the United States Supreme Court does under the fundamental and non-funda-
mental right standard of equal protection review. Compare Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969), with Schweiker v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 221 (1981).
127 In the cases that have arisen so far, the courts appear to be applying a "good faith"
rule. According to the Ontario Court of Appeals, the factors to be considered in determining
whether the admission of the evidence would "bring the administration of justice into disre-
pute," are the nature and extent of the illegality, the unreasonableness of the conduct in-
volved, and the state of mind of the officer (i.e., whether the officer acted in good faith or
knowingly infringed upon the accused's rights). See, e.g., Regina v. Chapin, 43 Ont. 2d 458,
462 (Ont. Ct. App. 1983). The police searched a parked vehicle in the absence of the driver
and found marijuana. The court held that the party seeking to exclude the evidence had the
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C. The Role of the Canadian Courts Under the Charter
This discussion has demonstrated that because the Charter is a
contemporary document, many of its provisions define the nature
and extent of the protection afforded individual rights more specifi-
cally than do the constitutional rights provisions of the United States
Constitution. The Charter's structure and text, unlike that of the
United States Constitution, also prescribe the mode of analysis for
the Canadian courts to employ when dealing with questions of con-
stitutional protection of individual rights. For these reasons, the role
of the Canadian courts in determining the course of development of
constitutional protection of individual rights in Canada will be com-
paratively less significant than the role played by the United States
Supreme Court and the federal courts in the United States.
This submission requires some careful explanation, lest its im-
port be misunderstood. The function of the Canadian courts with
respect to the Charter is exactly the same as the function of the
United States Supreme Court and the federal courts with respect to
the constitutional rights provisions of the United States Constitution:
to define the meaning of those provisions and to resolve all questions
of constitutional protection of individual rights. The difference in
roles in determining the course of development of constitutional pro-
tection of individual rights is due to the difference between the na-
ture of the Charter of Rights and the nature of the major
constitutional rights provisions of the United States Constitution.
Because of the relative specificity of many of the Charter's provi-
sions, the nature and extent of constitutional protection of individual
rights in Canada is to a considerable degree determined, or at least
influenced by, the text of the Charter, and the Charter's clear lan-
guage has resolved a number of constitutional questions that in the
burden of establishing that its admission would "bring the administration ofjustice into disre-
pute," and that here even if the search were unreasonable, the evidence would not be ex-
cluded. See also The Queen v. Esau, 20 Man. 2d 230 (Man. Ct. App. 1983), in which the court
held that the particular vehicle search probably was reasonable but that, in any event, the
admission of the evidence obtained by the search would not "bring the administration of
justice into disrepute." On the other hand, where it should have been clear to the officers that
the evidence was obtained in violation of the Charter, the evidence has been excluded. See,
e.g., The Queen v. Therens, 23 Sask. R. 83 (Sask. Ct. App. 1983) (evidence of breathalyzer test
excluded where accused was not advised of right to retain counsel); The Queen v. Starr, 48
Alta. R. 76 (Alta. Q.B. 1983) (same where test was administered in absence of counsel, over
objection of accused); R. v. Davidson, 40 N.B.2d 702 (N.B.Q.B. 1982) (illegal search). But see
The Queen v. Collins, 5 C.R.R. 1 (B.C. Ct. App. 1983), where police officers grabbed a sus-
pect by the throat to prevent her from swallowing the evidence. The court held that the
search was illegal, but that the admission of the evidence would not "bring the administration
of justice in disrepute."
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United States have required extensive constitutional interpretation
by the Supreme Court. In many cases, the task of the Canadian
courts will be one of applying fairly specific Constitution provisions
to particular factual situations. It is only with respect to certain
broadly-phrased and open-ended provisions of the Charter, such as
section 2, that the Canadian courts will have fully the same opportu-
nity as the United States Supreme Court and the federal courts have
had to determine the nature and extent of constitutional protection
of individual rights. On the whole, however, the Canadian courts
will operate within a narrower constitutional framework.
For this reason, the judicial role in determining the course of
development of constitutional protection of individual rights in Ca-
nada will be considerably more modest than it has been in the
United States.128 Judicial interpretation will not influence the devel-
opment of constitutional protections in Canada to the degree that it
has in the United States. Thus, although the judicial function in
128 This is totally apart from the diposition of the Canadian courts, particularly the
Supreme Court of Canada, to find constitutional violations. Some Canadian lawyers and
academics maintain that the Supreme Court of Canada is very "conservative" in the popular
sense, and will be reluctant to be activist" (as they perceive the United States Supreme Court
to be) in its interpretation of the Charter. In large part, this view seems to be based on the
very restrictive interpretation that the Supreme Court of Canada gave the Canadian Bill of
Rights. See note 7 .rupra. This view is set forth at length in Hovius and Martin, supra note 7.
The authors state:
It is widely believed that the entrenchment of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and' Freedoms presages a transformation of our system of government. This view,
which is heavily influenced by the United States experience of the last three de-
cades, assumes that the courts will be forced to play a new, activist role in our soci-
ety. We do not share this view. We believe that the courts, and in particular the
Supreme Court of Canada, will seek to avoid such an institutional realignment.
They will, instead, strive to ensure that the legislatures continue to bear the respon-
sibility for determining social policy. The history and traditions of the Supreme
Court of Canada favor an attitude of restraint. There is nothing in the Charter
which will compel the court to renounce its accustomed role. Indeed, there is much
which will be serviceable to judges disinclined toward activisim.
Id at 354-55.
The authors further state:
Any attempt to discern the approach which the Supreme Court of Canada will
take to the Charter must, therefore, take into account the attitude adopted by the
Court to the Canadian Bill of Rights. That attitude illustrates the tradition ofjudi-
cial restraint which, we argue, will determine the court's interpretation and applica-
tion of the Charter.
Id at 356.
The authors also contend that neither the status of the Bill of Rights nor its text demanded a
narrow construction of its open-ended concepts that a court which favored judicial activism
could have defined those concepts differently. Id at 363. The authors conclude:
We believe that restraint is a principle too deeply imbedded in the thought
processes of Canadian lawyers and judges to be abruptly displaced through the
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regard to constitutional protection of individual rights is the same in
adoption of the Charter. Conversely, activism as either an approach to judging or a
style of judging does not sit well with Canadian judges.
The courts, and in particular, the Supreme Court of Canada will not, then,
permit litigants to use the Charter as a means of bringing about basic changes in our
political system. They will not arrogate to themselves the authority to resolve the
great political and social questions of the day. They will maintain the Canadian
judicial tradition.
Id at 374-76 (footnotes omitted).
Some Canadian commentators, however, have expressed the view that the Court's narrow
interpretation of the Canadian Bill of Rights should not be looked to as a guide for its inter-
pretation of the Charter. As Judge LaForest has stated:
The difference, as I see it, is partially psychological. The Canadian Bill of Rights
was known to be an expression of self-restraint by Parliament. It was an instruction
by Parliament to the courts regarding the manner in which they should read Acts of
Parliament. But the courts were quite naturally inhibited from cutting down an
Act of Parliament that expressly enacted a provision that judges might otherwise
have been inclined to think offended against a right protected by the Bill. As can be
seen, I do not share the view of those who think the Bill was not sufficiently strongly
worded. I do not see how a non-constitutional Bill of Rights could have been
drafted except as a binding direction to the courts. But the Charter is a basic law of
the land to which Parliament and the legislatures themselves are subject.
LaForest, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms." An Overview, 61 CAN. B. REv. 19, 22-23
(1983) (footnotes omitted). See also M. MANNING, RIGHTS, FREEDOMS AND THE COURTS 21-
67 (1983).
The same view as to the difference between the judicial role in interpreting the Charter's
provision and in interpreting the Canadian Bill of Rights has been expressed by some lower
courts since the promulgation of the Charter. See R. v. W.H. Smith, [1983] 5 W.W.R. 235,
256-57 (Alta. Prov. Ct. 1983); Reference re § 94(2), [1983] 3 W.W.R. 756, 759-64 (B.D. Ct.
App. 1983); see also Southam, Inc. v. Director of Inves. & Research, [1983] 3 W.W.R. 385, 290-
91 (Aha. Ct. App. 1983), aftd, - S.C.R. -, Sept. 17, 1984; cf Mitchell v. The Queen,
[1976] 2 S.C.R. 570 (1975), in which the Supreme Court of Canada held that the "fair hear-
ing" provision of the Bill of Rights did not apply to revocation of parole. Post-Charter cases
have held that the revocation of parole without a proper in-person hearing violates § 7. See
The Queen v. Nuney, 5 C.R.R. 69 (Ont. High Ct. 1983); The Queen v. Conroy, 5 C.R.R. 118
(Ont. High Ct. 1983); Re Lowe and The Queen, 149 D.L.R.3d 732 (B.C.S.C. 1983); Re Swan
and The Queen, 150 D.L.R.3d 626 (B.C.S.C. 1983).
Regardless of how disposed the Supreme Court of Canada may or may not be to finding
violations of the Charter, as will be pointed out subsequently, the judicial role in the develop-
ment of constitutional protection of individual rights will be considerably more modest in
Canada than it has been in the United States. The nature and extent of constitutional pro-
tection of individual rights in Canada are to a substantial degree determined by the text of
the Charter, and the primary function of the Canadian courts in constitutional litigation will
be to apply fairly specific constitutional provisions to particular factual situations. The struc-
ture and text of the Charter also prescribe the mode of analysis that the Canadian courts are
to employ when dealing with questions of constitutional protection of individual rights. For
these reasons, the role of Canadian courts in the development of constitutional protection of
individual rights in Canada stnecturally will be considerably more modest than it has been in
the United States.
The "activisim" of the United States Supreme Court in extending constitutional protec-
tion to individual rights must be seen in the context of the fundamental difference between
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both nations, the judicial role in determining the course of the devel-
opment of such protection will not be the same in Canada as it has
been and will continue to be in the United States.
IV. The Constitutional Process in Canada
The constitutional process refers to the relationship between the
judiciary and the electorally accountable branches of government in
the establishment of constitutional norms. Since Canada has both a
parliamentary political system and a unitary court system, the consti-
tutional process there refers simply to the relationship between the
judiciary and the government. In the United States, the relevant re-
lationship is that between the federal judiciary and the electorally
accountable branches of the federal and state governments.
The constitutional process in the United States is structurally
confrontational, and the federal judiciary has the ultimate responsi-
bility for establishing constitutional norms. 129 The "case or contro-
the nature of the Constitution and the nature of the Charter of Rights. Because the major
constitutional rights provisions of the United States Constitution are so broadly-phrased and
open-ended, and because they were promulgated in the distant past, the constitutional pro-
tection of individual rights in the United States has developed in large measure by the Court's
interpretation and reinterpretation of these provisions and by the Court's application of these
provisions to current problems. The "activism" of the United States Supreme Court is "built-
in" to the constitutional structure. The Court must, to some extent, be "activist" in order to
perform its constitutional functions of defining the meaning of the Constitution and of apply-
ing a document "intended to endure" to problems of contemporary American society.
The United States Supreme Court has admittedly interpreted the constitutional rights
provisions of the Constitution expansively to impose very significant limitations on the power
of the federal and state governments to interfere with individual rights. Many of the provi-
sions of the Charter of Rights are not so broadly-phrased and open-ended as their American
counterparts, and the Canadian courts simply do not have the same "freedom of interpreta-
tion" as do the United States Supreme Court and the federal courts. The number of cases
presenting significant Charter questions in Canada will be proportionately fewer than the
number of cases presenting significant constitutional rights cases in the United States, at least
over a comparable period of time. In addition, the types of cases that shaped the develop-
ment of much of the constitutional rights doctrine in the United States are unlikely to arise in
Canada today. The types of cases presenting Charter questions in Canada are likely to be
cases in which the conflict between the values embodied in the Charter's provisions and other
societal values will be more balanced.
For all of these reasons, totally apart from the tradition of judicial restraint in Canada,
Canadian courts cannot be expected to be as "activist" as the United States Supreme Court
has been. The more modest role of the Canadian courts in the development of constitutional
protection of individual rights is sructuraly ordained, and "activisim" comparisons between the
Supreme Court of Canada and the Supreme Court of the United States will not be fruitful.
129 The United States Supreme Court has stated that the Marbug decision in 1803 "de-
clared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in exposition of the law of the
Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country
as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system." Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
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versy" limitation on the jurisdiction of the federal courts 30 precludes
the federal judiciary from rendering advisory opinions. 13' The fed-
eral and state governments may not obtain prospective determina-
tions of the constitutionality of a proposed law or plan of action.
Rather, constitutional challenges arise only when a private entity,
either in an affirmative or defensive posture, asks the federal courts to
declare an enacted law or governmental action unconstitutional. In
common parlance, the federal courts, and particularly the Supreme
Court, are said to "strike down" unconstitutional laws.
The federal judiciary has the ultimate responsibility for estab-
lishing constitutional norms in the United States. This responsibility
arises because the judiciary must define the meaning of the Constitu-
tion, and under the supremacy clause, 32 federal and state laws in-
consistent with the Constitution are void. Moreover, due to the
difficult process required to amend the Constitution, the Supreme
Court realistically has not only the ultimate responsibility for, but
also the final say on, the establishment of constitutional norms.
The structural confrontation inherent in the United States con-
stitutional process has fueled continuing controversy over judicial re-
view and the current "legitimacy debate" in constitutional
adjudication. When the Supreme Court strikes down existing laws or
governmental actions the Court appears to come into direct conflict
with the electorally accountable branches of the federal and state
governments. 33 The fact that the Court realistically has the final say
in the establishment of constitutional norms aggravates this conflict
and heightens the purported tension between judicial review and
electorally accountable policymaking.'3 4
In Canada, on the other hand, the constitutional process is not
structurally confrontational. 3 -5 While private entities may challenge
130 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2(1).
131 United States v. Muskrat, 218 U.S. 346 (1911). That the federal courts cannot give
advisory opinions has nothing to do with the benefits of adversary presentation and the like.
The jurisdiction of the federal courts is constitutionally limited to "cases and controversies,"
and the Supreme Court has interpreted that provision to require two parties with adverse
legal interests. The giving of advisory opinions then is constitutionally proscribed by the case
or controversy provision.
132 U.S. CONST. art VI, § 2.
133 The framework of the "legitimacy debate" has revolved around the purported tension
between judicial review and electorally accountable policymaking. See Sedler, supra note 2, at
95-97.
134 See id. at 123-26.
135 The role of the Canadian courts in defining the meaning of the Constitution was
"built into" the Canadian constitutional system from the very beginning. See notes 24-27
supra and accompanying text.
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the constitutionality of laws or governmental action in Canada, 36
constitutional questions may be brought before the judiciary in other
ways. For instance, the federal government can initiate a reference
to the Supreme Court of Canada. And provincial governments can
initiate references to the provincial court of appeals, with review as of
right in the Supreme Court.'37 In the pre-Charter period, approxi-
mately one-third of all Canadian constitutional cases originated as
references.' 38 The reference procedure is equally available for the
resolution of Charter questions.
By invoking the reference procedure, the government volun-
tarily asks the courts to determine prospectively the constitutionality
of a proposed law or course of action. A private entity is not asking
the courts to strike down an existing law or governmental action. In
this sense, constitutionalism in Canada could become a cooperative
venture. In theory at least, the government is trying to avoid violat-
ing the Constitution.139 The reference procedure gives the Canadian
judiciary an advisory, as well as adjudicative, function which avoids
confrontation. 140
The Charter's section 33 override provisions further reinforce
the potentially cooperative aspect of Canadian constitutionalism.
Under these provisions, either Parliament or a provincial legislature
may specifically provide that a law operates notwithstanding the fun-
damental freedoms provided in section 2, the legal rights provisions
of sections 7 through 14, and the section 15 equality provisions.' 41 In
other words, invocation of the override provisions isolates the law
136 Section 24(1) of the Charter specifically provides that, "Anyone whose rights or free-
doms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of
competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in
the circumstances." Apart from § 24(1), constitutional issues must be resolved when they
arise in any case, such as one in which the constitution is relied on defensively. Standing
requirements in Canada seem to be relatively liberal. See P. HOGG, CANADA ACr, supra note
20, at 64-66; see also P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supfra note 7, at 78.
137 See P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 129-30; (discussion of the refer-
ence procedure); see also Attorney-General of Ont. v. Attorney-General of Can. (Reference
Appeal), [1912] A.C. 571 (1912).
138 B. STRAYER, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION IN CANADA 182 (1968). Although
the reference procedure is not confined to constitutional questions, it has been used chiefly for
that purpose.
139 This is true whether the government is seeking a determination in regard to a pro-
posed law's being u/lra vires or in regard to its violating the Charter.
140 The reference procedure frequently involves a confrontation between the federal and
provincial governments, with the judiciary in the role of "neutral arbiter."
141 The effect of § 28, however, is to exempt sex-discrimination from the override provi-
sions of§ 33. See note 82 supra. A declaration of override is valid for five years, but at the end
of this period the declaration may be reenacted. See Constitution Act, 1982, § 33(3)(4).
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
from constitutional challenge under these sections. To the extent
that the override provisions are employed, parliamentary supremacy
remains incorporated in the Canadian constitutional structure. 42 In
Canada, then, unlike the United States, judicial review does not
mean judicial supremacy. Parliament and the provincial legislature
have final say over the circumstances in which most of the Charter's
provisions will operate. In the absence of override situations, how-
ever, the Canadian judiciary has the responsibility for establishing
constitutional norms.
The reference procedure and the override provision, taken to-
gether, structurally encourage a dialogue between the government and
the judiciary concerning the eject of the Charter of Rights in Canada.
While the constitutional responsibility to define the meaning of the
Charter lies with the judiciary, it is within the constitutional author-
ity of the federal and provincial government, because of the override
provisions, to determine when laws shall operate notwithstanding the
Charter. The dialogue could occur when the government, by way of
the reference procedure, asks the judiciary to tell it what the Charter
requires; the judiciary responds by advising the government of con-
stitutional requirements. The government then takes final action in
light of that advice. However, under the Canadian constitutional
structure, the judiciary's advice is not conclusive. The government
can make the policy determination that a given law is so necessary
for the public welfare that it should be enacted, despite the judici-
ary's advice that the proposed law violates the Charter. 43
The nature of the constitutional process in Canada could effect
the development of constitutional protection of individual rights.
The judiciary's function to define the meaning of the Constitution is
firmly established in Canada and is expressly recognized in the text
of the Constitution. And parliamentary supremacy is incorporated
into the Canadian constitutional structure as well. Therefore, a deci-
sion of the Canadian courts holding a law or governmental action
142 Section 33 was not in the original draft of the Charter, but was added at the insistence
of the provincial governments. See P. HOGG, CANADA AcT, supra note 20, at 33.
143 The government could also reenact a law with an override provision after the law had
been declared unconstitutional by the courts in an action under § 24(1) or in another pro-
ceeding. When the override provision is invoked, theoretically the law cannot violate the
Charter, because the law operates "notwithstanding" the Charter's provisions. For the view
that override will rarely be invoked, see LaForest, supra note 128, at 26. However, Quebec has
enacted blanket declaration, invoking the override provisions of § 33 with respect to all Que-
bec legislation adopted prior to April 17, 1982. The blanket declaration thus far has survived
legal challenge. See Re Alliance des Professeurs de Montreal and Attorney-General of Que.,
Que. Sup. Ct. Apr. 27, 1983, Canadian Charter of Rights Annotated 28-2.
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unconstitutional does not conflict with electorally accountable poli-
cymaking. Constitutional interpretation by the Canadian courts is
not "written in stone"144 and is really only an element of the dialogue
between the judiciary and government concerning the effect of the
Charter's provisions. 45  For these reasons, the Canadian courts
should feel less constraint, from a structural standpoint, in finding a
challenged law or governmental action unconstitutional 46 than
should the United States Supreme Court or the federal courts. 47
Likewise, the availability of advisory constitutional interpreta-
tions could influence the legislative process in Canada. The reference
procedure, coupled with the possibility of override, should encourage
the government to seek a judicial determination when the constitu-
tionality of a proposed law has been raised during the legislative de-
bates. 48 In any event, the constitutional process in Canada differs
significantly from that in the United States. And this section has
illustrated how the nature of the constitutional process could affect
the development of constitutional protection of individual rights in
Canada.
V. The Comparative Development of Constitutional Protections
of Individual Rights in Canada and in the United States:
Some Concluding Observations
This article has compared the structural differences between
144 In American constitutional law, it is "critically important that we get the questions
right and the answers right, because constitutional law is written in concrete and is not easily
washed out by rain or tears." Dixon, Bakke: A ConstilutionalAnaosis, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 69, 70
(1979).
145 This is not true, of course, for the provisions of the Charter that are not subject to
override. These include the democratic rights provisions of §§ 3-5, the mobility rights provi-
sions of § 6, sexual equality under § 28, and the language and minority language educational
rights provisions of §§ 16-23.
146 By the same token, it has been contended that because state constitutions in the
United States are usually amendable by popular initiative and do not require the
"supermajority" that is necessary to amend the federal Constitution, a state court should be
more disposed to find that state governmental action violates the state constitution than the
United States Supreme Court or federal courts should be in finding that a governmental
action violates the federal Constitution. Since the state constitution is "closer to the people,"
the people of the state can readily amend the state constitution to overturn a judicial interpre-
tation of the state constitution with which they strongly disagree. See Kelman, supra note 1, at
432.
147 For the view, however, that 'Judicial restraint" rather than "judicial activism," will
characterize the Supreme Court of Canada's interpretation of the Charter, see the discussion
in the excerpt from Hovius & Martin, supra note 128.
148 Canadian colleagues with whom I have discussed this point are of the view that the
government will be reluctant to utilize the reference procedure in these circumstances.
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protections of individual rights under the constitutional systems of
Canada and the United States. The following discussion will focus
on factors that may lead to a different course of development of con-
stitutional protection of individual rights in Canada than that which
has occurred in the United States.
For a number of reasons, constitutional doctrine on individual
rights is likely to develop somewhat more slowly in Canada than it
has in the United States. First of all, the Canadian system allocates
power exclusively to one level of government or the other, and there
is a unitary court system in Canada. As a result, individual rights in
Canada can be judicially protected on non-constitutional or ultra
vires grounds, as well as on Charter grounds. As previously men-
tioned, the Canadian Supreme Court's likely preference for non-con-
stitutional grounds or ultra vires grounds will reduce the number of
cases in which it must resolve Charter questions.' 49 The number of
challenges to governmental actions under the Charter is further re-
duced by the specific nature of its constitutional provisions. 5 0 Pre-
cisely because of this specificity, in many Charter cases the court's
role will not go beyond the application of fairly specific constitu-
tional provisions to particular factual situations, and "landmark"
cases under the Charter are less likely to arise.
One other factor which may reduce the number of significant
constitutional rights cases in Canada is the exclusive allocation of the
general criminal law power to the federal government, rather than
the provinces. In the United States, many important constitutional
questions have arisen through challenges to state and local criminal
laws implicating individual rights. The laws usually reflect moral
judgments and views about the propriety of particular conduct.
Often they are enacted in response to local pressures and attitudes
which are absent on the national level or as to which there is no
national consensus. Similarly, if the general criminal law power in
Canada were a provincial function, at least some provinces would
enact criminal laws interfering with individual rights that would not
be enacted by Parliament, and in the aggregate, there likely would
be more laws interfering with individual rights by way of criminal
prohibitions. So, the fact that the general criminal law power is
lodged at the federal rather than the provincial level in Canada will
reduce the number of laws interfering with individual rights by way
of criminal prohibition and to this extent will reduce the number of
149 See notes 69-70 supra and accompanying text.
150 See note 129 supra and accompanying text.
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cases presenting Charter questions. In addition, provincial laws in-
terfering with individual rights may sometimes be invalidated on ul-
tra vires grounds as being in relation to the criminal law, 151 thereby
further reducing the number of cases that the Canadian courts will
have to resolve on Charter grounds.
Another factor which may not only slow the development of
constitutional rights doctrine in Canada, but may also influence the
content of such doctrine, is a temporal phenomenon. Questions con-
cerning constitutional protection of individual rights in Canada
could not arise until after 1982. Contemporary constitutional doc-
trine in the United States has evolved over a long period of time, and
has developed in large part in response to conditions existing at dif-
ferent times in American society. A major ingredient in the develop-
ment of constitutional rights doctrine in the United States has been
pervasive governmental action that clearly was inconsistent with the
values embodied in constitutional provisions protecting individual
rights. Much of the constitutional rights doctrine that emerged was
reactive to such action. Subsequent doctrinal development occurred
within and later cases built upon the framework established by ear-
lier cases. Thus, the content of American constitutional rights doc-
trine has been strongly influenced by the context in which it first
developed. For example, first amendment doctrine developed in re-
sponse to governmental repression of dissent and expressions of un-
popular ideas.152 The "chilling effect" concept gained prominence as
a result of this course of development, and gave rise to the "void on
its face" doctrine, 153 and the "New York Times rule,"'' 54 and provided
an analytical basis for the invalidation of any law regulating expres-
sion.155 So too, a long history of pervasive official discrimination
151 See, e.g., The Queen v. Westerndorp, 46 N.R. 30 (Can. Sup. Ct. 1983); Henry Birks &
Son (Montreal) Ltd. v. City of Montreal, [1955] S.C.R. 799 (1955); cf. Schneider v. British
Columbia, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 112 (1982), in which the Supreme Court of Canada held that the
compulsory treatment of heroin addicts by various methods, including detention, was intra
vires, on the ground that its "pith and substance" was health legislation and within provincial
power under § 92(b), rather than a "colourable attempt" to stiffen the criminal law.
152 This is reflected in the evolution of the "clear and present danger" test, from Schenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), through Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), to
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
153 See the discussion of the relationship between the concept of "chilling effect" and the
"void on its face" doctrine in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973). Se also
Sedler, The Assertion of ConstitutionalJus Teri"i: A Substantive Approach, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 1308,
1326-27 (1982).
154 See the discussion in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255, 271-80 (1964).
155 See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers, 103 S. Ct. 416 (1982); Miami Herald Pub. Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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against black Americans and other racial minorities shaped the de-
velopment of equal protection doctrine. And racial discrimination
has served as the benchmark for the equal protection analysis of
other forms of discrimination. 156
An important factor likely to affect the development of constitu-
tional rights doctrine in Canada cases is the absence of cases involv-
ing "outrageous" governmental action. American constitutional
rights doctrine was shaped, at least in part, by those kinds of cases.157
But most cases involving such flagrant constitutional violations
would be unthinkable in Canada today, just as they would be un-
thinkable today in the United States. Cases presenting Charter ques-
tions are more likely to be closer ones, where the conflict between the
values embodied in the Charter's provisions and other societal inter-
ests will be more balanced. In such cases, the Charter will not "cry
out for application," and the Canadian courts may not see the same
necessity for finding a constitutional violation as did the United
States Supreme Court when deciding some landmark constitutional
cases.
As the Canadian courts decide how much protection the Char-
ter affords individual rights, they will necessarily consider the context
of the Charter claim and the "general climate of freedom" prevailing
in Canada today. 58 Indeed, the resolution of many Charter cases
156 "Over the past 30 years, this Court has embarked upon the crucial mission of inter-
preting the Equal Protection Clause with the view of assuring to all persons 'the protection of
equal laws' in a Nation confronting a legacy of slavery and racial discrimination." Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 293-94 (1978) (Powell, J.) (citations omit-
ted). The similarity and differences between racial discrimination and other forms of discrim-
ination have been relied on in determining the "suspect" nature of those forms of
discrimination. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14
(1976) (age); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685-88 (1973) (gender).
157 For example, the first important case involving a challenge to a coerced confession
under the fourteenth amendment's due process clause was Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278
(1936), where the confession was extracted by severely whipping the helpless defendant. Like-
wise, the earlier cases where the "clear and present danger" test was invoked successfully were
cases where persons were convicted or involved crimes carrying serious sentences for doing
nothing more than assisting in meetings called by the Communist Party, see Dejonge v. Ore-
gon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937), or distributing Communist Party literature, see Herndon v. Lowry,
301 U.S. 242 (1937).
158 The same "general climate of freedom" prevails in the United States today. The kind
of "outrageous governmental conduct" cases that arose in earlier times and that shaped the
development of constitutional rights doctrine in the United States arise infrequently. In the
cases that do arise, the government is likely to be able to assert a substantial interest to justify
the interference with the individual right, and the balance between the asserted governmental
interest and the individual interest is likely to be much more even than it has been in times
past. Thus, in the first amendment area, for example, we no longer see cases where the gov-
ernment is trying to repress the expression of dissent or unpopular ideas. Rather the first
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may well depend on the Canadian courts' view of what constitutes a
"reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society."' 59 In any event, the contemporary
context in which constitutional rights doctrine will develop in Ca-
nada will influence the content of that doctrine and the nature and
extent of the Charter's protections. The protections may differ signif-
icantly from the United States Supreme Court's interpretations of
individual rights under the Constitution. 160
The promulgation of the Charter has unleashed a number of
constitutional rights cases that were "bottled up" in the pre-Charter
era. But by far, the largest group of these cases challenge criminal
trial procedures under the Charter's legal rights provisions. These
kinds of challenges occur whenever a legal system affords constitu-
tional protection to criminal defendants. Counsel, seeking acquittals
for their clients, will take advantage of all available defenses.1 6' In
addition, initial litigation will involve a number of challenges to pre-
Charter laws that now either clearly or plausibly violate the Char-
ter. 1 62 Of course, there will also be some cases that raise novel and
amendment cases generally involve questions such as the protection afforded to commercial
speech and the access rights of the media. Many of the constitutional rights cases coming
before the United States Supreme Court today, seem to involve "secondary" rather than "fun-
damental" questions, and deal not infrequently with the application of prior-established prin-
ciples to particular situations. Truly "landmark" constitutional cases, resolving
"fundamental" questions, or pronouncing significantly new doctrine, or broadly expanding
constitutional protection, are fairly hard to find in the recent Terms of the United States
Supreme Court.
159 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Attorney-General of B.C., [1983] 2 W.W.R. 413 (B.C.S.C. 1982)
(disqualification of persons on probation from voting violates § 3, and is not a reasonable
limit prescribed by law); ef Re Federal Republic of Germany and Rauca, 41 Ont. 2d 225
(Ont. Ct. App. 1984) (extradition is a reasonable limit on the citizen's right to remain in
Canada under § 6(a); Re Global Communications, Ltd. & Attorney-General of Can., 44 Ont.
2d 609 (Ont. Ct. App. 1983) (temporary ban on publication of evidence given at bail hearing
in extradition case until completion of accused's trial in the United States is a reasonable
limit on freedom of the press).
160 It will be interesting to see for example, whether in the freedom of expression area, the
Canadian courts will adopt something akin to the "void on its face" doctrine, or will impose
constitutional limitations on the ability of public officials to recover damages for defamation.
161 This phenomenon certainly has appeared in the United States since the "constitution-
alization" of criminal procedure by the Supreme Court in the 1960's and thereafter.
162 The "reverse onus" provision of § 8 of the Narcotics Act that requires the accused to
disprove intention to sell after the prosecution has proved mere possession is an example. All
the courts of appeal that have passed on the question have found the "reverse onus" provision
to violate the presumption of innocence contained in § 11 (d). See Regina v. Oakes, 40 Ont.
2d 660 (Ont. Ct. App. 1983); The Queen v. Stanger, 2 D.L.R.4th 121 (Alta, Ct. App. 1983);
R. v. O'Day, 46 N.B.2d 77 (N.B. Ct. App. 1983); R. v. Carroll, 40 Nfld. & P.E.I 147 (P.E.I.
Ct. App. 1983); R. v. Cook, 56 N.S.R.2d 449 (N.S. Supreme Ct. App. Div. 1983). On the
other hand, the offense of possessing housebreaking tools in circumstances giving arise to an
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significant questions concerning constitutional protection of individ-
ual rights. 163 Nonetheless, after the initial stage of litigation has
passed, the number of cases presenting challenges under the Charter
will be much more measured. And for the reasons discussed above,
there will be proportionately fewer cases raising significant questions
of constitutional protection of individual rights than in the United
inference that they were used for housebreaking is not considered to impose a "reverse onus"
on the accused, and so does not violate § 11(d). See R. v. Holmes, 41 Ont. 2d 250 (Ont. Ct.
App. 1983); The Queen v. Kowalczuk, 20 Man. 2d 379 (Man. Ct. App. 1983). In Re Boyle
and The Queen, 41 Ont. 2d 713 (Ont. Ct. App. 1983), the court dealt with a presumption
that where the accused was in possession of a motor vehicle with the identification number
obliterated, the vehicle was obtained by the commission of an indictable offense and the
accused knew that it had been so obtained. The court held that the first part of the presump-
tion was valid, but the presumption of knowledge by the accused that the vehicle was so
obtained violated § 11 (d).
See also Southam, Inc. v. Director of Inves. & Research of the Combines Inves. Branch,
11983] 3 W.W.R. 385 (Alta. Ct. App. 1983), afd, Sept. 17, 1983, in which the court held that
a section of the Combines Act (the Canadian anti-trust law) that authorized investigators to
enter the premises of a business establishment and take away any documents that might
afford evidence of a violation of the Act violated the unreasonable search and seizure provi-
sions of § 8.
163 See the freedom of conscience and religion cases in note 112 supra. Another important
area at the present time involves the "free press-fair trial" controversy. For illustrative cases,
see Re Global Communications, Ltd. and Attorney-General of Can., 44 Ont. 2d 609 (Ont. Ct.
App. 1984) (court upheld order of extradition judge in a highly-publicized case barring the
publication of the evidence taken at a bail hearing until the completion of the accused's trial
in the United States); The Crown v. Robinson, 5 C.R.R. 25 (Ont. High Ct. 1983) (allowing
publication of accused's name and address does not violate presumption of innocence under
§ 11(d); The Crown v. Sophonow, 21 Man. 2d 110 (Man. Ct. App. 1983) (court would not
restrict publication of all extra-judicial commentary respecting guilt or innocence until ap-
peal had been decided); The Crown v. Begley, 2 C.R.R. 50, 38 O.R.2d 549, (Ont. High Ct.
1982) (court imposed ban on press coverage of facts on application for change of venue until
the conclusion of the accused's trial).
Challenges have also been made to various forms of pornography regulation. See Re
Ontario Film & Video Appreciation Soc'y and Ont. Bd. of Censors, 45 Ont. 2d 80 (Ont. Ct.
App. 1984) (film censorship law, which contains no standards to determine when license to
show film can be refused, violates § 2(b)); Re Hamilton Indep. Variety & Confectionary
Stores and City of Hamilton, 4 C.R.R. 230 (Ont. Ct. App. 1983) (municipal law authorizing
officials to enter "adult entertainment parlours" for purpose of enforcing law regulating sale
of "erotic goods" is invalid because definition of "erotic goods" is vague and uncertain): Re
Luscher and Deputy Minister, Revenue Canada Customs and Excise, 149 D.L.R.3d 243
(Vancouver County Ct. 1983) (federal customs act provision that bans importation of goods
of an "immoral or indecent character" is valid).
See also Van Mulligen v. Saskatchewan Hous. Corp., 23 Sask. R. 66 (Sask. Q.B. 1982), in
which an employee of a provincial crown corporation, who was also a municipal alderman,
voted against provincial government policy at a municipal meeting, and as a result was trans-
ferred to another job. The retaliatory transfer was held to violate the employee's freedom of
expression rights under § 2(b). Cf Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
For a general discussion of the impact of the Charter's freedom of expression guarantee
on existing Canadian laws and practices, see Beckton, Freedom ofExpression-Access to the Courts,
61 CAN. B. REv. 101 (1983).
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States over a comparable period of time, and still fewer cases in
which the Supreme Court of Canada will have to resolve the case on
constitutional grounds. Therefore, it is submitted that constitutional
doctrine in the area of individual rights in Canada is likely to de-
velop more slowly over a comparable period of time than constitu-
tional rights doctrine has developed in the United States.
Second, the Canadian judiciary's role in developing constitu-
tional protections of individual rights is likely to be more modest
than that of the American judiciary. As discussed above, in a
number of instances, the Charter's text substantially determines the
nature and extent of constitutional protection. Certain broadly-
phrased and open-ended provisions, such as the fundamental free-
doms guarantees of section 2, will provide the Canadian courts with
the same opportunity to shape the development of constitutionally
protected individual rights as has been the case in the United States.
On the whole, however, the Canadian courts will operate within a
narrow constitutional framework, and frequently their function will
be to apply fairly specific constitutional provisions to limited factual
situations. As a result, judicial interpretation will not influence the
development of constitutional protection of individual rights in Ca-
nada to the same degree it has in the United States.
Finally, the nature of the constitutional process in Canada could
lead to a "constitutional dialogue" between the judiciary and the
government. The availability of the reference and override proce-
dures provide both the judiciary and the government with a constitu-
tionally prescribed role in determining the extent of the protection of
individual rights against governmental action. 164 The reference pro-
cedure avoids confrontation and allows the government to obtain a
prospective judicial declaration of the constitutionality of a proposed
law or course of action. Thus, constitutionalism can be a cooperative
venture in Canada. If the judiciary advises the government that the
proposed law would violate the Charter, the government may choose
to avoid friction and stay its hand. Yet the override provision allows
the government to adopt a given law or course of action notwith-
standing the judiciary's advice, if it makes the policy determination
that it is necessary for the public welfare. In this situation the gov-
ernment will have made a political decision for which it is electorally
accountable. The Canadian constitutional structure thus accommo-
dates both the doctrine of judicial review and the principle of parlia-
mentary supremacy. However, the possibility of this' "c6nstitutional
164 See notes 135-43 supra and accompanying text.
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dialogue" could influence both the courts, when resolving particular
constitutional questions, and the legislative process, when the consti-
tutionality of a proposed law is raised during legislative debate.
With the entrenchment of individual rights in Canada by the
promulgation of the Charter, the structures of constitutional gover-
nance established by the Canadian and United States Constitutions
have moved into congruence. In Canada, the exercise of governmen-
tal power designed to protect individual rights is now subject to con-
stitutional limitations. And Canadian courts can now provide relief
from unconstitutional governmental action.
Significant differences remain, however, in the structures of con-
stitutional governance established by the United States and Cana-
dian Constitutions. Moreover, the nature of the Charter of Rights
and the United States Constitution differs fundamentally. These dif-
ferences, combined with the factors previously mentioned, will likely
lead the development of constitutional protections of individual
rights under the Charter on a course different from that witnessed in
the United States.
The future course of Canada's constitutional development
should interest the American observer. Just as Canada can learn a
great deal from the United States' experience, Americans may glean
some valuable insights from the Canadian constitutional experience
as it unfolds. Comparative constitutionalism is now no further than
the open border to our north.
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